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This thesis explores the feasibility of using alternative models for determining the
material readiness of Reserve Naval Construction Force units. There is no system
currently in place to measure and determine either the readiness contribution of the
equipment and supplies on hand for these forces, or the material condition of the
essential combat and major end items that will be used to carry out the wartime
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the feasibility of using alternative models
to determine the material readiness of Reserve Naval Construction Force (RNCF)
units. The RN'CF presently reports unit readiness via the Unit Status and Reporting
(UNTTREP) System for personnel and training only. Material inventories are reported
as not on hand but will be supplied from Prepositioned War Reserve Material Stock
(PWRMS). Material condition is not reported.
The current system is inadequate and does not provide the information required
to accurately assess the readiness of RNCF units. A greater understanding of what
readiness is and how it is currently measured will help to suggest an approach which
will satisfy the needs of the RNCF, its resource sponsors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS).
B. BACKGROUND
In 1983 a program was begun to improve the readiness of the RNCF by
prepositioning war reserve material stock dedicated to these units. The dedicated assets
were exempted from normal PWRMS reporting since they were to be containerized
and configured to unit sets. This means that material will be packaged separately and
dedicated to a specific unit. In a period of rapidly evolving hostilities the RNCF could
not assemble, stage and deploy its units unless a significant quantity of material were
prepositioned and configured in this manner.
Material has now begun to arrive in significant quantities. Continuing to report
via the Unit Status and Reporting System, in the same manner as is currently done,
does not reflect the real change in readiness. The Civil Engineer Support Office
(CESO) in Port Hueneme, California has been tasked by the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command (NAVFACENGCOM) to develop a system for determining the
material readiness of RNCF units. These units will then use this system's outputs to
reflect the changes in their readiness posture in their UNITREP submissions.
The goal of this system is to enable these units to accurately report their overall
combat readiness rating and to show the annual incremental gains which have been
experienced as funds have been expended on PWRMS. This thesis is designed to
further the progress of reaching this goal and to suggest alternative approaches and
models for inclusion in this system.
C. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used was a literature search of all relevant models and reports
available from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), the Defense
Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) and the Federal Depository.
Personal interviews were conducted at the Army Concepts Analysis Agency, The Naval
Facilities Engineering Command, the Headquarters of the Army Corps of Engineers,
the Civil Engineer Support Office, the 31st Naval Construction Regiment and at
various offices within the Pentagon.
D. ORGANIZATION
The body of this thesis is laid out in five chapters. Chapter II explores the
background and development of readiness concepts and terminology, the Unit Status
and Reporting System, and proxy readiness measures employed within the Department
of Defense. Chapter III details the current RNCF status within the Department of
Defense, the Navy and the Naval Construction force. It also outlines the development
of the RNCF and the current initiative to upgrade its readiness. The present reporting
system is examined in brief.
Chapter IV examines and compares the Active Duty Naval Construction Force
readiness reporting system and the U.S. Army's readiness reporting system. The two
systems are compared and contrasted for their applicability to the RNCF. Chapter V
developes a proposed model for determining the expected readiness of an RNCF unit.
It shows how the model may be used to determine the contribution to readiness gained
by prepositioning war reserve material stock and it briefly explores and suggests a more
refined model which weights RNCF Table of Allowance (TA) material based on
criticality and mission contribution rather than on dollar value alone.
Recommendations for further research are included at the end of the chapter.
E. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions were placed in this chapter for the convenience of the reader.
They are developed and explored in greater detail in the remainder of this thesis. The
first set of conclusions is based upon observation, interviews and analysis of the
current reporting systems of the Naval Construction Force and the U.S. Army.
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The first conclusion is that any assessment of the readiness resource areas must
be based on the actual material on hand. This is to say that readiness must be
deterministic and can not rely on the probabilities of receiving material at some future
point in time. There is a degree of leeway provided to the Services in that only critical
material and equipment need be reported. All resource evaluations in Part I of a
UNITREP must be made against the wartime requirements of a unit.
A second conclusion is that the RNCF will unnecessarily limit their readiness
rating if they adopt the Naval Construction Force readiness reporting system. The
active Naval Construction Force uses a rigorous approach to measuring readiness in
that their system measures almost all of a unit's table of allowance. The table of
allowance for Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCBs) includes ninety days of
sustainability for supplies and repair parts, and fifteen days of sustainability for
subsistence and petroleum products. By adopting the active Naval Construction Force
(NCF) system the RNCF will limit its overall combat readiness rating by including
sustainability which is not needed to satisfy JCS requirements.
The Active Duty NCF readiness reporting system values supplies on hand based
on their acquisition cost which is often a poor approximation for their true military
worth. The Army's readiness reporting system has much to offer the RNCF in that it
assigns essentiality codes to equipment that can then be used to determine where to
invest the annual incremental funds available to have the greatest impact on readiness.
Essentiality codes can also be used to select and measure the readiness of those items
which are the most critical and without which a unit will not be able to perform its
mission.
Another conclusion is that the Army's Mission Capable (MC) rate measure is
better suited to the needs of the RNCF. The Active NCF reports equipment readiness
based on a snapshot which shows equipment readiness as of the date of the
UNITREP. The Army system reports historical readiness which means that Army
Reserve and National Guard units report the average equipment availability for the
previous ninety day period. Since the RNCF will be receiving the readiness figures
from CESO and not developing them internally, a historical readiness based equipment
readiness rate will be revealing to the units as well as to the UNITREP users.
When the RNCF adopts a base from which to compare equipment or supplies on
hand to wartime requirements, it must remain constant or readiness trend data will be
unreliable. This is to say that if the RNCF decides only to measure that equipment
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and material which is considered critical to a unit, it should not arbitrarily expand the
quantities or types of equipment and supplies measured since readiness will fluctuate
with whatever base is chosen. This also means that once equipment and supplies are
configured to unit sets they can not be withdrawn and used for other purposes without
causing fluctuations in their assigned unit's readiness.
Another conclusion is that Part II of an RNCF UNITREP should be used to
report subjective estimates of unit capabilities and that the Army's Mission
Accomplishment Estimate (MAE) should be adopted for RNCF use. The Mission
Accomplishment estimate is a subjective assessment by a unit's commanding officer of
the percent of the unit's mission it is able to accomplish. The MAE is a mandatory
entry for Army units reporting a C-4 or C-5 overall combat readiness rating. This is
expanded upon in Chapter IV.
The next set of conclusions are based on the work down in developing the model
found in Chapter V. The first conclusion is that the proposed model which relies on
the forecasted average Procurement leadtime (PCLT) and its Mean Absolute deviation
(MAD) is an effective method for determining the expected percent of material on
hand at a future point in time. It can be used to help determine how quickly
deficiencies can be reduced in RXCF assets in the event of a mobilization.
Another conclusion is that the model can also provide an effective means of
determining the contribution to readiness which is brought about by the prepositioning
of war reserve Material stock. While resources reported to the JCS in Part I of a
unitrep must be based on material physically on hand, a model which is capable of
forecasting the expected readiness of a unit that does not have a full wartime allowance
is better suited to the needs of resource sponsors and unit commanders.
At this point it is best to explore the entire issue of readiness further by
examining the components of readiness and the historical development of its
measurement within the Department of Defense. Chapter II will elaborate on this
development.
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II. WHY MEASURE READINESS?
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Shortly after the start of World War II, Great Britain was confronted with a
series of complex problems in warfare which it desperately needed to solve. It created
the first operations research groups which brought together teams of scientists and
engineers to assist field commanders in answering perplexing tactical and strategic
questions. The teams were composed of men and women who were asked to tackle
intricate problems outside of their fields of expertise. Biologists, chemists and
mathematicians studied questions which ranged from the best allocation of depth
charges in antisubmarine warfare, to the evaluation of cost and effectiveness of
complete military systems. [Ref. 1: p. 8] The success of these teams led the United
States to adopt this approach by 1942.
Operations research continued in use within the Department of Defense (DOD)
after the WWII but got its next boost with the elections in November of 1960 when
Robert McNamara was selected by the Kennedy transition team to be the next
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). McNamara brought with him Charles J. Hitch and
others from the RAND Corporation. It was Hitch, the author of The Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age [Ref. 2], who organized and headed an operations research
division within the Defense secretariat.
During the McNamara years, economy and efficiency became watchwords and
the use of quantitative economic analysis became inexorably intertwined with
determinations of resource allocation. The importance of proper allocation became
especially pressing when the Kennedy Administration adopted a national strategy of
flexible response and moved away from a then unrealistic strategic doctrine of massive
retaliation.
Under the flexible response doctrine, the U.S. military was organized based on
contingencies and commitments around the world. This doctrine called for a quick
response to hostilities by a small task force, with follow-on augmentation of the proper
size by units using sea and airlift capabilities [Ref. 3: p. 4]. Since the task forces were
composed of joint service forces, a need existed to assure that resources were allocated
properly among these services.
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It was also during this period that the Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System (PPBS) came into being. While the PPB system centralized budgeting power in
the hands of the Secretary of Defense, it also provided a system to assist the Secretary
in making rational choices about the allocation of resources among competing
programs.
The initial PPB system provided a groundwork for implementing a national
military strategy. For the first time within DOD, there was a linkage between the
financial inputs and military outputs resulting from the budget process.
The next development which occured was the recognition by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) and the services that a formalized system for reporting readiness was
needed. After the Berlin crisis of 1961, when the Army was preparing to reinforce its
European-based units, it found that its overall readiness posture was considerably
worse than had been estimated. As a result of this, the Army developed their first
central reporting system in 1963. [Ref. 4: p. 19] After the publication of the Army
directive implementing this system, the JCS then required the other services to develop
similar systems modeled after the Army's approach.
Even though the National Defense Act of 1947 had required the services to
provide DOD with a current readiness report on all operational forces, no reporting
procedure had been developed up to this time. It was in 1967 that the JCS
incorporated each service's readiness reporting system into a comprehensive joint
system called the Readiness Operations (REDOPS) Report. The Coast Guard was
included as part of the Navy reporting system, since in time of war the Coast Guard
transfers to the Department of Defense under Navy jurisdiction. Individual units
reported up their chain of command using a Force Status and Identity (FORSTAT)
Report. This system, however, suffered from a lack of uniformity across Service lines.
By the late 1970s it was apparent that there was a need to further standardize and to
better define what readiness was and how to measure it.
B. THE TAXONOMY AND DEFINITION OF READINESS
Readiness is an often spoken but little understood word when used in a military
context. To many people within the Department of Defense and the Federal
The 1986 Packard Commission report has sought to further strengthen the
utility of PPBS by improving Defense strategy development and the Congressional
Defense budget process.
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government, as well as to the general populace, a state of readiness is thought of as
implying:
the capability, with a hish deeree of confidence, of winning anv war, fought anv
place at any time. [Ref. :>: p. 2-1]
A military organization which is not capable of responding according to this definition
is not ready.
Readiness, when used in this context, refers to the overall military capabilities of
the nation. This definition however, presents difficulties to a military or civilian analyst
when attempting to quantify readiness or to relate readiness to levels of funding.
All military units do not possess the same capabilities for countering the myriad
of conceivable threats to the nation's securitv. Indeed, each unit is created to address
specific aspects of a threat and is organized along the mission and task, lines needed to
counter the threat. This is done to facilitate an organized management of the nation's
defense forces.
For purposes of quantification, readiness as it is defined above is too broad a
term to be meaningfully applied down to a unit level. A further shortcoming of this
definition is that the term is also used by logisticians and military planners to refer to
two other concepts: material readiness and personnel readiness. Both of these concepts
are the focus of their concerns. The general usage definition falls short of providing a
meaningful basis for measuring and incorporating these other types of readiness.
Difficulties have arisen within DOD and the Congress over the imprecise use of
the term readiness. These were highlighted in a 1980 General Accounting Office
(GAO) report. This report [Ref. 6] stated that in both the 1980 House of
Representatives Panel on Readiness and a U.S. Air Force-sponsored study, there was
concern over the lack of uniformity in defining readiness. The Air Force study had
uncovered forty-four definitions of readiness and related terms in use within DOD.
[Ref. 6: p. 6]
As a result of the above concerns, DOD, the JCS, and the military Services
developed a standardized taxonomy of definitions for readiness and related terms.
These were incorporated into JCS Publication 1 in 1982 [Ref. 7]. The definitions
follow.
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Military Capability: The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a
war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components:
• Force Structure - Numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise
our Defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, airwings.
• Modernization - Technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and
equipments.
• Readiness - The ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or equipments to
deliver the outputs for which they were designed (includes the ability to deplov
and employ without unacceptable delays).
• Sustainability - The "staving, power" of our forces, units, weapon svstems. and
equipments, often measured in numbers of days.
As can be seen, readiness or force readiness is viewed as a component of military
capability. It should also be noted that force readiness implies mobility and an
integration and coordination of the units within a force. The hierarchical relationship
for military capability is shown in Figure 2.1.
Military Capability
Force Force Force Force
Structure Modernization Readiness Sustainability
Figure 2.1 Relationship of Readiness to Associated Terms.
Force readiness is only one of the key components of the broader concept of
military capability. It can be clearly seen that a military force, under this standard
definition, might be 100% ready but still not provide an adequate degree of military
capability due to a deficiency in either force structure, modernization or sustainability.
It is also possible for a military force to be less than 100% ready and still perform
adequately the mission for which it was intended.
Figure 2.2 shows the further breakdown of force readiness into its sub-
components of material and personnel readiness.
Material readiness from the viewpoint of DOD [Ref. 8: p. 1831] and the JCS
involves two further considerations:
• inventories of equipment and supplies on hand relative to the wartime
requirement, and
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the condition of this hardware relative to its ability to perform the functions for
which it was designed, procured or modified.
Personnel readiness from this same viewpoint involves two considerations also:
inventories of personnel on hand relative to the wartime requirement, and
the status of training for these personnel for the functions thev must perform in
wartime.
Force Readiness
Material Readiness Personnel Readiness
Material Material Personnel Training
Inventories Condition Inventories
Figure 2.2 Taxonomy of Readiness.
This standardized set of definitions for readiness and related terms, as adopted by
the JCS, makes the task of quantitatively measuring readiness more feasible. The four
factors listed at the bottom of Figure 2.2 provide the basic measures used by the JCS
to determine the readiness of all reporting units.
For material inventories, the readiness measure used is the percentage of critical
material physically on hand versus the forecasted wartime requirements. For personnel
inventories, it is the percent of people on hand versus the forecasted wartime
requirements. For training, the measure is the percentage of training accomplished
versus that which is required. For material condition, there are several measures. The
one most often used is the Mission Capable (MC) rate. 2 This is essentially the average
percentage of time a weapon system or piece of equipment is able to perform the
functions for which it was designed, procured or modified. This measure can be
aggregated across different types and quantities of equipment and weapon systems.
2This is equivalent to Operational Availability (A ) which is the term used to
describe an individual system's state of functional readiness at any point in time. The
only difference is that MC is expressed as a percentage whereas A
o
is expressed as a
probability: MC = AQ * 100 = (Uptime/Totaltime) * 100.
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The readiness measures discussed thus far are reported through the chain of
command to the JCS by the Unit Status and Reporting (UNITREP) System. The
UNITREP replaced its predecessor, FORSTAT, in February of 1980. This provided
for increased coverage of factors which affect the readiness of units. It incorporated
personnel and logistics reports and changed the base of measurement to reflect actual
wartime requirements instead of peacetime allowances.
C. UNIT STATUS AND REPORTING (UNITREP) SYSTEM
The UNITREP system is managed and controlled by the Office of the JCS
(OJCS). Under this system unit reports are submitted up through the chain of
command to the JCS, via the Unified and Specified Commanders-in-Chief (CIXCs).
The reports must be written according to broad guidelines established in JCS
Publication 6 [Ref. 9: p. 2-1-3]. Service reporting rules tailor this information further
and provide additional reporting guidance. At a minimum reports are required to be
submitted whenever a change occurs which affects a unit's overall readiness rating.
The principal measure of unit readiness used within DOD and provided by the
UNITREP is the C-rating, or combat readiness rating. The C-rating is used to
determine the overall readiness of a reporting unit. The five categories of overall
readiness are defined as follows in the order of decreasing readiness:
1) C-l, Fully Combat Ready. A unit possesses its prescribed levels of wartime
resources and is trained so that it is capable of performing the wartime
mission for which it is organized, designed, or tasked.
2) C-2, Substantially Combat Ready. A unit has onlv minor deficiencies in its
prescribed levels of wartime resources or training which limit its capability to
perform the wartime mission for which it is organized, designed, or tasked.
'
3) C-3, Marginally Combat Ready. A unit has major deficiencies in prescribed
wartime resources or training which limit its capability to perform the wartime
mission for which it is organized, designed, or tasked.
4) C-4, Not Combat Ready. A unit has major deficiencies in prescribed wartime
resources or training and cannot effectively perform the mission for which it is
organized, designed7or tasked.
5) C-5, Service Programmed, Not Combat Ready. Due to Service programs, a
unit does not possess the prescribed wartime resources or cannot perform the
wartime mission for which it is organized, designed, or tasked.
Units which are rated C-5 are restricted to the following categories: ships in
overhaul or restricted availability, units undergoing major equipment conversion or
transition, units placed in a cadre status by the parent Service, units which are being
activated, inactivated or reactivated, units which are not manned or equipped but are
required in the wartime structure, and units with a primary task as training units that
could be tasked to perform a wartime mission.
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The overall C-rating is based upon input from each of the four resource
categories shown in Figure 2.2. These categories are equivalent to the following:
Equipment and Supplies on Hand, Equipment Readiness, Personnel, and Training.
Each of these are then converted into C-ratings by criteria shown in Tables 1 through 4
The overall C-rating for a unit is the lowest C-rating for any of the four categories.
TABLE 1
PERSONNEL C-RATING CONVERSION TABLE
CRITERIA RESOURCE AREA COMBAT RATING
C-l C-2 C-3 C-4 C-5
a. Total available strength >90% >80% >70% <70% N. A.
divided by structured strength.
b. Service selected critical >85% >75% >65% <65% N. A.
MOS qualification of available
strength divided by structured
strength of critical MOS.
c. (Optional by Service) Grade >85% >75% >65% <65% N. A.
fill of Service selected crit-
ical E-5s and above available
divided by structured strength
of critical E-5s and above.
The UNTTREP system was designed to provide a picture of force readiness to the
National Command Authorities. It was not intended to provide a mechanism for
developing budgets or for evaluating a commanding officer's performance. The
UNTTREP system was designed expressly to let the JCS and Services know which units
are ready to go to war on short notice. For those units that are not ready, the
UNTTREP indicates what resources constrain them.
The UNTTREP format can be and is used by each Service to collect additional
detailed information. The Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard require mission areas and
capabilities to be assessed. The Army requires mission accomplishment estimates for
units reporting C-4 or C-5 overall ratings. (For a further discussion of the definitions
of mission area assessments and mission accomplishment estimates, see chapter IV.)
This supplemental reporting data is intended to provide a more complete assessment of
Service specific readiness and to identify in greater detail the resource categories that
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TABLE 2
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ON HAND
C-RATING CONVERSION TABLE
CRITERIA RESOURCE AREA COMBAT RATING
C-l C-2 C-3 C-4 C-5
a. Total Service selected >90% >80% >65% <65%
combat essential equipment
possessed divided by prescribed
wartime requirement.
N. A.










CRITERIA RESOURCE AREA COMBAT RATING
C-l C-2 C-3 C-4 C-5
a. Total Service selected
combat essential equipment
possessed and combat ready
divided by total wartime
>90% >70% >60% <60% N. A.
requirement.
b. Major Service selected end
items of equipment possessed
and combat ready divided by
>90% >70% >60% <60% N. A.
prescribed wartime requirement.
are constraining the overall C-rating. With the greater level of information provided
by Service reporting requirements, resources can be reallocated to eliminate deficiencies





CRITERIA RESOURCE AREA COMBAT RATING
C-l C-2 C-3 C-4 C-5





.t train- >85% >70% ='55% <55% N. A.
D. PROXY READINESS MEASURES
Before leaving the discussion of readiness, there are several additional indicators
of readiness that should be examined. These indicators are used by DOD and the
Services as proxy measures. These are substitute measures which are used to show
whether or not the basic measures accurately reflect the readiness posture of reporting
units. The proxy measures also indicate the health of various logistics systems.
The basic measures are reiterated in Table 5 and some, but not all, of the proxies
which are used within DOD are shown in Table 6.
TABLE 5
BASIC READINESS MEASURES
% Equipment versus Requirements
% Personnel Inventories versus Requirements
% Training versus Requirements
Mission Capable (MC) Rates
As would be expected, proxy measures are directly related to the basic measures
of readiness and provide insight into factors that contribute to increases or decreases in













Mental Categories of Enlistees
Match of Skills and Grades versus Jobs
Personnel Turbulence/Stability
increase and the match of skills and grades versus jobs improves, the percent of
personnel inventories versus requirements will also improve. It is also reasonable to
assume that the training resource area will show improvement as the number of
exercises and battalion training days increase.
While all proxy readiness measures are not collected in the UNITREP, they are
monitored by various agencies within the Services and DOD. For example, the Navy
Enlisted Personnel Management Center (EPMAC) in New Orleans collects information
on unit manpower shortages by quantity, paygrade, occupational specialty (Rating or
MOS), and educational training (NEC).
Deficiencies which degrade unit readiness are filled on a priority basis. The
ability to fill these deficiencies however, is directly related to the mix of personnel
assets available.
This raises the next key point. There is an interaction between the variables
which affect readiness and which, in turn, affect military capability. The proper mix of
personnel assets may not be available, at a given time, because of manpower ceilings
imposed on DOD by the Congress or because recruitment or retention have decreased.
22
If the personnel are not available due to a decrease in recruitment or retention then
this decrease, in turn, may have been brought about by a higher operating tempo
which created longer periods of family separation. It could also have been caused by
an improved national economy and a relative decrease in the perceived value of
military compensation.
Trends in proxy indicators may call attention to problems but they also point the
way to possible solutions such as: increasing salaries and benefits, stepping up
recruiting efforts, or both. As actual personnel skill and grade levels decrease in
relation to a unit's wartime requirements; there will be an effect on the quality of
training and possibly (depending on the mix of personnel assets affected) on the
maintenance of the unit's equipment or its ability to obtain the necessary support from
the logistics system.
There is a direct correlation and interaction between each of the basic measures
of readiness. While it is proper to aggregate them on the basis of a measure such as a
unit's overall C-rating. it is also important to realize that each resource category
represents a decision variable which involves a question of economic choice that must
be answered to provide balance to the total system.
Charles Hitch expressed this idea as follows:
An economicallv efficient solution to military problems does not imply a cheap
force or a small military budget. It simplv implies that whatever the military
budeet . .
., the greatest military capabilities are developed. Since militarv
capabilities are plural and not easily commensurate, an efficient militarv
establishment, in the technical sense, would merely be one in which no single
capability - antisubmarine warfare, ground warfare, offensive air, an so on -
could be'increased without decreasing another. [Ref. 2: p. 123-124]
This economically efficient solution applies equally well to the basic measures of
readiness and the resources that they represent. The choices that are made to
maximize force readiness given a fixed budget are the same choices that must be made
to minimize the cost per unit of readiness attained.
It should be apparent why readiness is measured within the National Defense
establishment. What may not be apparent is that readiness is a perishable commodity
that requires the constant application of resources. These resources must be managed
efficiently to maximize their contribution to the military capability of the Nation.
Suitable systems must be put in place to assure that this is accomplished.
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III. THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A. BACKGROUND
National objectives are first developed by the president and are then translated
into strategic concepts and military objectives. Various groups within the executive
branch including the Departments of State and Defense as well as the National
Security Council (NSC) provide inputs. With the aid of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), the president also provides guidance for the annual budget process and
preparation of the president's budget for submission to the congress.
The JCS has responsibility for the part of the PPB system which generates the
DOD portion of the president's budget. An annual Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
(JSOP) is prepared which states the JCS position on the forces required to meet
military objectives for the current and future years of the Five Year Defense Plan
(FYDP). The JSOP is then forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for planning
purposes. While the JSOP in the past was of little worth, since the JCS did not
constrain their planning to realizable level of funding, this has changed recently and the
JSOP now provides a valuable planning tool [Ref 10: p. 263].
Decisions concerning threat assessment, force levels, and force mix are reflected
in the strategic, logistic and programming guidance provided by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) to the military Services and to the CINCs. This
programming guidance takes into account the budget totals which the Secretary
believes will be eventually approved and appropriated by the congress. Based upon the
military objectives outlined and the funding constraints imposed, a national military
strategy is formed.
1. Operation Plans
Operation Plans (OPLANs) are developed by the CINCs in line with national
military objectives. Input is obtained from each of the Services in order to formulate
plans on how best to meet a specified threat. An OPLAN is a document which lays
out in detail the plan for military operations over a large geographic area and cover
considerable periods of time. For instance, an OPLAN which covers the Pacific
theater, is under the cognizance of the Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC). The
Service input for the Navy portion of a Pacific theater OPLAN would come from the
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Navy Service component commander who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet (CINCPACFLT). Each Service component commander identifies the support
that they consider necessary to accomplish the strategic mission identified by the
unified commander. Plans are then laid out in sufficient detail to identify the force
levels and logistics materials that will be necessary to accomplish the mission.
2. Joint Operations Planning System
To provide uniformity among the Services and CINCs in developing operation
plans, the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) was created under the direction of
the JCS. It provides a mandatory set of detailed procedures for the development,
review and eventual execution of OPLANs. JOPS provides both a system and a set of
computer-based software aids to assist in force, logistics and transportation planning.
The system includes the capability to integrate the required personnel, equipment,
supplies and support facilities needed to successfully execute any operations plan. It
also specifies the planning, and review procedures for each logistics element and
provides a Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) to promote efficient use
of the logistics pipeline.
Within an appendix to the logistics annex of an OPLAN can be found the
Civil Engineer Support Plan (CESP). The CESP identifies the facilities that will be
required and the units needed to assemble and maintain those facilities in support of
the Navy's mission. The CESP is developed by processing information in a data base
known as the Civil Engineering File (CEF). The CEF is composed of data elements
which contain information on Advanced Base Functional Components (ABFC).
3. Advanced Base Functional Components
The Advanced Base Functional Component System is a tool of Naval
logistics:
It is the quantitative expression and measurement of planning, procurement,
assembly and shipping of material and personnel needed to satisfy emergency
facility support requirements overseas. An ABFC is a grouping of personnel,
facilities, equipment and material designed to perform one of the special
functions or accomplish a particular mission of an advance base. [Ref. 11: p. 1]
While this rather dry statement sums up the nature of an ABFC, it is lacking
somewhat in color and depth.
The Navy has built advance bases ever since the War of 1812 when the first
one was constructed on Nukihiva Island in the Marquesas by the commanding officer
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of the USS ESSEX in October of 1813. The base, Fort Madison, located in what is
now French Polynesia, was needed as a safe harbor to allow refurbishment of the
ESSEX and some captured ships before engaging a British Naval squadron which was
actively searching for ESSEX. While the base was later overrun by hostile natives and
the ESSEX was eventually captured by the British, it points out that a need existed
early in the nation's history for the Navy to have the ability to build, maintain and
defend advance bases in support of the fleet.
It was not until World War II, when the SeaBees were constructing a series of
advance bases throughout the South Pacific, that a need to standardize facilities
became apparent. Standardization meant pre-engineering the facilities in order to more
efficiently utilize the personnel, material, supplies and equipment available for the war
effort. It also meant prepackaging the facilities to save time and reduce wastage of
assets. This in effect was the precursor of the Navy's ABFC system of today.
A grouping of material and personnel that make up an ABFC represents
preplanning of the material and personnel needed to perform a specific function.
Examples of ABFCs are shown in Table 7. The Navy's ABFC system is managed
under the control of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-44). OPNAV publication
41P3A [Ref. 11] is the definitive table of advance base functional components. In
order to assure that material planning for ABFCs is maintained, the CNO has assigned
each ABFC to a hardware or systems command (SYSCOM). Examples of dominant
commands responsible for various ABFCs can also be seen in Table 7.
Each command assigned responsibility for an ABFC maintains a detailed
Advanced Base Initial Outfitting List (ABIOL). This is an itemized line-item list of the
material in each ABFC. Other commands may be assigned responsibility for a part of
the material in an ABFC and are then responsible for maintaining their portion of the
ABIOL.
There is a third set of documents, besides OPNAV P-41P3A and the ABIOL,
needed to complete the picture of the ABFC system. This third set is the Advance
Base Functional Components Planning Guide, NAVFAC P-437 [Ref. 12]. The ABFC
Planning Guide is a two volume document. Volume I contains reproducible
engineering drawings and networks, and volume II contains detailed lists of facilities,
assemblies and line items required for the construction of the components of an
advance base. A member of a Navy planning staff must use at least the information
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TABLE 7
EXAMPLES OF ADVANCE BASE FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS4
TITLE
Mobile Facility - Small Craft Base
Inshore Undersea Warfare Patrol (Heavy)
Underwater Demolition Team
Military Sealift Command Office (Small)
Naval Base Communications (Large)
Fleet Issue Load List (Afloat Resupply)
Ships Store Facilities (5000 to 7000 men)
Naval Overseas Air Cargo Terminal (Large)
Refrigerated Storage Facilities (4000 men)
Ship Repair (Medium)
Decontamination of Ships Exposed to NBC
Warfare








Naval Mobile Construction Battalion























contained in P-41P3A and P-437 to determine which components are needed when
tailoring an advance base to an OPLAN.
4NAVSEASYSCOM is the Naval Sea Svstems Command. SPAWARS is the
Space and Naval Warfare Svstems Command. NAVSUPSYSCOM is the Naval
Supply Svstems Command. NAVAIRSYSCOM is the Naval Air Svstems Command.
NAVMEDCOM is the Naval Medical Command. NMPC is the Naval Military
Personnel Command.
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There is one other item that must be understood before moving on in this
discussion. Some of the components in the ABFC system are operational as is, i.e.
they contain all of the necessary personnel, structures and material needed to perform
their mission. Other components contain facilities or material only and must be
applied to other components for integration into an advance base plan.
An example of a component that is self-contained is the P25 which is a Naval
Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB). A NMCB has a wartime complement of 24
officers and 738 enlisted personnel. It also has 239 pieces of Civil Engineer Support
Equipment (CESE) which range from 1/4 ton utility trucks to 35 ton cranes. The
mission statement of an NMCB as stated in P-41P3A reads as follows:
This is an integral component in personnel, administration, housing, subsistence
and equipment consisting of one Headquarters Company, one Equipment
Companv and three Construction Companies. It is technically and basically
equipped to prosecute the general construction work of an advance base,, such as
housing, buildings, airfield, roads and bridges, waterfront, utilities, fuel
installations, ect. "Supplemental equipment and supplies required for exceptional
tasks or terrain conditions are provided by a Naval Construction Force Support
Unit (NCFSU), P31. This component is' equipped and supplied to service and
provide organizational and field maintenance for its own automotive and
construction equipment. Component is trained and infantrv equipped for
defensive warfare.
A tent camp is included as an integral part of the component.
Disaster Control is a function of this component and the personnel are trained
accordingly. Equipment and materials are included for disaster recovery7 with the
personnel 'and equipment of this component. The equipment and material
required for base recovery must be provided through the Po series components.
[Ref. 11: p. P25-1]
To construct many of the major ABFCs, a full NMCB is required and must be
included in an OPLAN.
4. Prepositioned War Reserve Material Requirements
Only some of the approximately 200 components, 800 facilities, 1700
assemblies and tens of thousands of ABIOL material line-items in the ABFC system
have been procured and warehoused for use in a contingency. The ABFC system does
not by itself provide any material, equipment or personnel. By specifying a
requirement for a specific component or set of components in an OPLAN though, a
Navy planning staff signals that a need for the material exists. The material
requirement becomes part of the Navy Prepositioned War Reserve Material
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Requirements (PWRMR) when it is incorporated into a CNO Special Project within
the Navy Support and Mobilization Plan (NSMP).
PWRMR is that portion of the War Reserve Material Requirement (WRMR)
which approved plans dictate be positioned prior to the outbreak, of hostilities. The
material is to be positioned at or near the point of planned use or issue to the user.
When an ABFC is included in a CNO Special Project, this provides authorization for
the material to be acquired and maintained in a specified state of readiness. The
dominant commands shown in Table 7 take action to procure and preposition this
material subject to limitations in funding and budgetary constraints.
Once material has been procured and prepositioned, it is then referred to as
Prepositioned War Reserve Material Stock (PWRMS). Material, which is related to
the construction phase of a CNO Special Project, is stockpiled at one of the three
Construction Battalion Centers (CBCs) which are located at Davisville, Rhode Island;
Port Hueneme, California; and Gulfport, Mississippi.
War Material Requirements (WMR) are by nature always greater than the
war material stock available to fill these requirements. As in any organization, the
military attempts to invest its next available dollar where it is likely to provide the
greatest return. For the armed forces, this return is measured in terms of increased
military capability. Since all OPLAN contingencies are neither equally likely, nor of
the same strategic significance to national interests nor have the same time constraints
applied to them, some stated requirements go unfilled until after mobilization. Figure
3.1 shows the relationship of War Requirements (WR) to prepositioned war reserve
material stock.
B. THE RESERVE NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE
The Reserve Naval Construction Force (RNCF) has never had sufficient
equipment and supplies on-hand to perform its wartime mission. This is because its
organizational units were considered to be ABFCs which, it was assumed, could be
assembled prior to the onset of hostilities. Additionally, the perception was not firmly
established that the upfront investment in equipment, supplies and material to support
these units was warranted given competing demands on the limited funds available to
the Navy.
Figure 3.2 shows the current allowance of RNCF units approved by congress.
The RNCF is composed of one Reserve Naval Construction Brigade (RNCB), nine
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Figure 3.1 PWRMS as a Subset of War Requirements .
Reserve Naval Construction Regiments (RNCR), four Reserve Naval Construction
Force Support Units (RNCFSU) and seventeen Reserve Naval Mobile Construction
Battalions (RNMCB).
All told, there are over five hundred officers and almost fourteen thousand
enlisted personnel represented in the brigade organization. In addition to the
substantial investment in personnel and training that the RNCF represents, each unit
also requires its own Table of Allowance (TA). The TA is that material and CESE
needed to provide the facilities and assemblies to make these units self-sustaining and
capable of carrying out their missions.
What is not apparent from the figure is that WMR = WRMR + Peacetime
Operating Stock (POS). Peacetime operating stocks are those stocks other than
PWRMSTthat are carried in the logistics system to support the operating requirements
of a peacetime military force. It is also the case that WRMR = PWRMR +
OWRMR. OWRMR is Other War Reserve Material Requirements and represents






















































































































Figure 3.2 Brigade Organization of the RNCF.
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In 1983 the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-44) placed renewed emphasis on the
RNCF. It was realized that these forces did not have the capability for mobilization
and rapid deployment that was needed by the fleet. Contingency planning called for
the NCF to possess the ability to repair, construct, maintain and operate shore, inshore
and deep ocean facilities in support of the Navy, Marine Corps and other Services and
agencies of the federal government. More importantly the RNCF has specific early
and critical missions in a war effort which include War Damage Repair (WDR), Rapid
Runway Repair (RRR) and fleet hospital construction. OP-44 recognized that the
RNCF could not be capable of earning out its mission, when required, unless a
significant portion of its needed material was identified and procured as PWRMS.
In 1983 the total deficiency in material, based on the outfitting of seventeen
battalions, was S253 million. A plan was therefore set into action based on an
identified need to improve readiness by outfitting the RNCF. The plan contained the
following steps:
• solidify the requirements
• reduce non-essential material in the TA
• examine alternative equipment sources
• obtain funds to eliminate the deficiency
In addition, a proper format to display the problem was needed to increase the
RNCF's credibility when requesting funding for the shortfall in the PPB process.
The requirement for the current NCF was confirmed by the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command based upon liaison with the CINCs and the Service component
commanders. The next step was the reduction of non-essential material in the tables of
allowance for each type of unit within the RNCF. An important consideration was
that the RNCF represents two-thirds of the total Naval Construction Force after
mobilization, but both the dollar value and gross weight of the TAs were excessive
when examined from the perspective of a comptroller or logistician. The Naval
Facilities Engineering Command decided that both the active and reserve forces should
maintain the same, but a somewhat reduced, allowance from what was then authorized
in P-41P3A and the ABIOLs.
After the reduction of non-essential material in the TA, which eliminated such
items as barber chairs and communion wafers, and deferred other purchases until
mobilization, the total of RNCF deficiencies was reduced to S207 million in April of
1985.
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Alternative equipment procurements were also examined concurrently with this
reduction of non-essential material. Methods such as obtaining loans of equipment
from state and local municipal highway departments as well as lease and buy
arrangements with construction contractors were explored. The lease with purchase
option was finally selected and is currently undergoing contract negotiations.
C. FUNDING
The final portion of the plan called for funding of the identified and validated
shortfalls in material and equipment. This was pursued.
In a prepared statement given to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 15
March 19S4 for the FY 1985 deliberations on the authorization of DOD
appropriations, Rear Admiral William D. Daniels, USNR, Deputy Commander of the
Naval Reserve Force stated:
Major equipment shortfalls still remain in many areas of the Surface Reserve.
The most significant areas are in the Naval Mobile Construction Forces. Cargo
Handling Battalions and Beach Groups. These shortages include major
equipments such as earth moving equipment, trucks, trailers, weight handling
equipment and a sizable shortage of tools, clothing, bedding, tents, ect. The
Navy has an aggressive plan to address these shortages throughout the Five Year
Defense Plan (FYDP). [Ref. S: p. 2061]
This and other testimony before congress helped to identify the Navy's need for
funding to increase the readiness of the RNCF.
At this point it should be easy to see how direct the relationship is between
funding, military capability and force readiness. Table 8 shows the key budget
accounts which affect the RNCF and have a direct efTect on its readiness.
Each appropriation shown in Table 8 represents a separate authorization by Act of
Congress to incur obligations and to make payments from the U.S. Treasury. Since
the RNCF is technically a set of ABFCs whose material and equipment have been
approved for PWRMS, it has been necessary to obtain funds from various
appropriations and sources in order to assemble and maintain these assets.
Under OP-44's plan the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, as the RNCF
Program Technical Manager, took a more aggressive role in programming for the
material to outfit the force. The RNCF has also submitted programming issues to the
Chief of Naval Reserve for improving administration and training. As a result of these
and other efforts, a shift in perception regarding the importance of improving RNCF
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TABLE 8






-2C Cog material ( non USN) -Incentives
-Materials Handling Equipment
-Weapons
OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE NAVY STOCK FUND(O&M^/O&M^R)
-Depot Repairs -War reserve material stock
-Consumable items -Peacetime operating stock
-Force operations
-Battalion training days
readiness has taken place and increased funding has become available. Some funds
have come from Procurement, National Guard and Reserve, some from the Navy
Stock Fund, some from the SYSCOMs for ABIOL material support and some from
DOD approved programs such as the containerization of the TAs to improve force
mobilization capability. The following is a breakdown of funds received in fiscal years
1983 to 1986:
• FY 1983: S8.4 million in 0&M,N for NSF material.
• FY 1985: S20.0 million in P,NG&R for CESE, Materials Handling Equipment
(MHE), TA-4 Is, containers, RADIAC and photographic gear. SJ.8 million in
0&M,N for NSF material.
• FY 1986: S19.0 million in P.NG&R. S59 million in NSF to complete
requirements. S8.3 million for CESE and containers.
The appropriations shown are: OP,N which is Other Procurement,Navy, \VP,N
is Weapons Procurement,Navy, P,NG&R is Procurement.National Guard and Reserve.
0&M,N is Operations and Maintenance.Naw, 0&M,NR is Operations and
Maintenance.Naval Reserve and MP,NR is Military Personnel.Naval Reserve. The
Naw Stock Fund is a revolving fund established for the purpose of providing working
capital to finance the procurement of all stores and supplies carried in stock in the
Navy stock account. It is not an appropriation but it must be funded to increase the
quantity of stores and supplies available in the supply system.
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As this money has been made available, and equipment and material were
procured, the RNCF technical managers needed a format to graphically display the
progress which was being made. A format was developed in the autumn of 1985 and is
used in presentations given to resource sponsors who figure prominently in the PPB
process. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the format used to identify the deficiencies.
As can be seen, the vertical axis represents RNCF units in the order of their
priority. The horizontal axis shows the breakout of component equipment by
appropriation and type of material. The dollar values, expressed in thousands,
represent the remaining deficiencies and show a breakout between material which could
be purchased now, if funds were available, and that which will be deferred until
mobilization. This format is shown in black and white but has been previously color
coded for ease of visual reference. Because of this color coding, it has been commonly
known as the Sherwin-Williams chart.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 represent more than just visual aides to identify dollar value
deficiencies in RNCF equipment and material. By prioritizing the various types of
units based on a compilation of all the CINC OPLAN requirements, the units with the
most urgent missions could be outfitted first. In order to do this though, a change in
the management philosophy of RNCF PWRMS had to take place. Previously,
PWRMS was treated as a single pool of assets which were owned by the resource
sponsor. Segregation of the material was required to identify portions of material
stored in lots as belonging to specific units.
After balancing the alternatives and obtaining the necessary approvals, a doctrine
was adopted to outfit and configure the material to unit sets. This essentially means
that material will be packaged separately for each unit. To accomplish this segregation
and, in addition, to realign the NCF with the transitioning of the merchant fleet to
containerships, a containerization program was developed. A contract was awarded in
June of 1986 and the first deliveries were scheduled for December. This
containerization program applies to over 95% of the line items but less than 50% of
the weight of an RNMCB because it does not include oversized items or CESE
[Ref. 13: p. 4].
By stratifying PWRMS material to unit sets and containerizing it, the RNCF will
have significantly increased their material readiness and mobilization capability. A
negative aspect, though, is that containerization also means these assets will loose
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Figure 3.3 RNCF Deficiencies by Priority of Units and Appropriation7 .
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shelf life. Most of the material which will be procured at mobilization has a short shelf
life or is composed of Special Material Identification Coded (SMIC) items, which
means hazardous or flammable. This material is scheduled to be bought or included in
the packup of the TAs. Other items in this deferred category were selected by the Fleet
Material Support Office (FMSO) on their review of line-item listings submitted for
PWRMS buys with Navy Stock Funds. A prominent group included in this category is
lumber and wood products.
With the advent of the drive to improve RNCF capability has come the
requirement to exercise responsible management control over these assets and to
maximize the capability of the RNCF with the annual incremental funds that become
available.
D. RESERVE READINESS MATERIAL REPORTING SYSTEM
In September of 1986 the Civil Engineer Support Office (CESO), a component of
CBC Port Hueneme which performs decentralized NAVFAC management functions,
put forward a draft Mission Element Needs Statement (MENS) to be used in final
form to justify the funding for the development of a Reserve Readiness Material
Reporting System (RRMRS). The RRMRS, as proposed, will be developed under
contract in the private sector. The system is needed to provide information support to
the CNO via OP-44 and to enable a rapid mobilization of RNCF assets by tracking the
status of equipment and material assets which are in procurement, maintenance and
stock. The RRMRS will interface with existing systems and re-establish the asset
visibility which will be lost after containerization.
1) Priorities are established in accordance with FAC 062A memorandum of 18
Jul 1986. The CHBs interspersed throughout the RNCF prioritv list are not shown. 2)
All figures are expressed in 1987 dollars and have been adjusted'to reflect 17 battalions.
3) AlfFYDP dollars are based on best information available as of 1 Oct 1986. prior to
OSD mark and FY87 DOD appropriation. 4) CESE: FY87 FYDP of S3.17M applied.
FY88 FYDP of S.8S6M applied. FY89 FYDP of S2.665M applied. 5) 2C Non USN:
Deficiencies shown are based on stratification of 1 Oct 86 by prioritv. No F\DP S
through FY89. 6) CONTAINERS: FY87 FYDP of S1.466M applied. "FY88 FYDP of
S.283M applied. FY89 FYDP of S1.998M applied. 7) MHE: FY87 FYDP of S.934M
applied. FY88 FYDP of S1.927M applied. FY89 FYDP of S1.271M applied. 8)
COMM: No FYDP S through FY89. 9) RAD/PHOTO: No FYDP S through FY89.
10) WEAPONS: FY87 FYDP of S3.5M applied. FY88 FYDP of S3.5M applied. FYS9
FYDP of S3.5M applied. 11} CBR MASKS: Procurement rejected by Air Force Sep 86
- NSF recouped bv FMSO. Shortages exist in O&M.N for the 17 Air Dets and in NSF
for the 17 RNMCBs (TA01-TA41) 12) NAVY STOCK FUND: Net deficiency reflects
NSF items non-procurable because of known system cancellations and local





-i c r*r**F\eo.-ip«*oo*00\ 04
.j r*. st3 os oc «* <r O *c 3r^ r*» 04 o < l*S (A tA -T <-





3 w CD ON 0- cc CM \t ON CM —
82 ^ u^ c v£ c SO T F1 NO IT
tr
lA
sfi 4 4 •4 NO ^ tr 2
Os tn Ml «1 IT 0* tA tf CN ON
£ c C c IT c a
s
rfN O G lA o
(? 9 F ON On S r" F ON
a "





ia Nfl so sfl tA NO lA lA _4k a u- F" F- f r*» F* F1 0s
*- X * N< sC S£ s< f SO
o SO
*~ **
a O O o O O O O O o o o c
</i
t% o. o. 0> On NC 04 CN NO
<T •c <r <r •fl <J -cr -q
NOS 04
o2 </>2 5 ^
"<3 CD <7i 8
= Sg FN
r- ^ r* 4 r* r»» iaLn 0^ -4 r^ r^ •V IA
<r
E u as * *> <r 04
<? <T m o 0\ 04 •& <r






9 a ^H KS iA
5
1
no no NO 0A 43 VQ NO r*. 0\ SO no ON O
Q »A j-> tA 04 u-t tA «A o 04 iA iA 04O J ^ «T " •« V 04 " •*r -a- " A
as
2 3
— PiH FN FN sok KN. r* so ks 9\
04 S£ 04 -CO* 04 Oco O O nj r» FN
~* ~t 04 NO SO r\ 04 >A fA 04 NO
£ * "
ia •A tA lA NO NO - * » - o\
3 ~ r» r*» r* r«* r*. <T •C o CO CD o 3CL OS ON Os 0s OS CO fA NO NO




OS ON « FN FN 0\ r^ NO FN. FN SO o




_ O _ r«- so CD SO -4 ON *A CM ON
FN <r o 0s _
4
04 Os K\ lA no so FN
04 o fn 0s 04 0«» p»- — CO K* o
r«» NO 0s bA 1A •cr no r»«









Li. — •H o -1 r- V0 CO 04 pH ON lA (N -H
FN •4 o OS ^H 04 o fA IA no so 04O FN 04 KS pv K\ «A
H- (N V0 OS lA NO <r no 04




-< o 04 FN




BE § 1 I z z Z Z z
a:o
z z 2 § i
* r* CD 0s
s
^H o
^L « •cr <T ml JA iA >A
0J CU QJ
?I?
Figure 3.3 RNCF Deficiencies by Priority of Units and Appropriation . (cont'd.)
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An important part of this proposed system will be its ability to handle and
process asset data to provide the following information:
1) Acceptable materials for the RNCF. This includes information on suitable
substitutes. (Currently the military supply system generates suitable substitute
listings but these are often at odds with the particular requirements of the
2) Replacement, cost and budgetary data.
3) Prepositioned War Reserve Material Requirements versus stock on-hand.
4) Identification of deferred items in PWRMR, their availability and the
procurement leadtime for these items.
In addition to satisfying various interface requirements, the system must also be
capable of generating the equipment and supplies on hand information used by
individual RNCF units when computing and reporting their combat readiness rating
via the UNITREP system.
When completed this ambitious system development effort will provide a valuable
management control tool and planning aide. The information needs of senior
commands responsible for resource ownership and assessment as well as those of the
reserve operating forces will be met if the system is implemented and designed with
forethought.
E. THE CURRENT RNCF UNITREP SYSTEM
Commissioned RNCF units, (those shown in Figure 3.2), transitioned from the
Reserve Training and Support System (RTSS) and began reporting their readiness via
the UNITREP system in August of 1986 [Ref. 14: p. 1]. At present, however, only the
actual readiness of personnel and training is reflected in the reserve's UNITREPs. A
C-4 condition is reported for the equipment and supplies on hand portion and a
notation is added that these assets will be supplied from PWRMS. The C-4 condition,
as shown in Chapter II, Section C, indicates that a unit is not combat ready and has
major deficiencies in wartime resources which prevent the unit from performing its
mission. An overall C-5 or no count rating is also assigned to each UNITREP.
The problem with the current system is that it does not reflect the significant
gains which are being made in force material readiness. The Naval Facilities
Engineering Command and the RNCF are justifiably concerned that if the incremental
gains are not properly reflected in the UNITREP system, the JCS will write the RNCF
out of any contingency plans which call for a rapid mobilization and deployment
capability. Without adequate feedback to resource sponsors on the effect that their
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investments have made, continued support for additional funding in the FYDP is in
jeopardy.
The RRMR system will be designed to provide the information needed to
properly assess the material readiness of RNCF units as currently measured by the
UNITREP system. The purpose of this thesis, as previously stated, is to examine
alternative models to enable an accurate assessment of the individual unit's readiness
posture and to portray this in an appropriate format to the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the
UNITREP svstem.
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IV. OTHER DOD READINESS REPORTING SYSTEMS
A. THE ACTIVE NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE
After having examined the nature of readiness and the current methodology for
readiness reporting by the RNCF, it is appropriate to examine alternative systems now
in effect as candidates for RNCF use.
The active Naval Construction Forces report their readiness by UNITREP to the
CINC under whose operating control (OPCON) they are assigned. This is done in
accordance with the procedures detailed in COMCBPAC/COMCBLANT8 Instruction
3501.1 [Ref. 15: p. 1], This instruction also applies to RNCF units upon mobilization.
The Navy annex to JCS Publication 6 [Ref. 9: p. 2-6-B-l] states that Naval
operating units will report the four resource categories and their overall C-rating after a
determination is made of each unit's primary mission area capabilities. These Primary
Mission Areas (PRMARs) are assigned to Naval forces based on the purpose for
which they were organized, designed or tasked. The primary mission areas for all
Naval forces are contained in OPNAV Instruction 3501.2. They are further defined for
the Naval Construction Force in OPNAV Instruction 3501.1 15A [Ref. 16]. This latter
instruction describes the primary mission areas, Projected Operational Environment
(POE) and the Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) for each type of unit in the
NCF, and RNCF brigade organization.
1. Projected Operational Capabilities and Required Operational Environment
Table 9 shows the projected operational environment of NCF and RNCF
units. Table 10 shows the required operational capabilities of an NMCB or RNMCB
in the primary mission area of Construction (CON). The primary mission areas which
involve NCF units are: Mobility (MOB), Command, Control and Communications
(CCC), Special Warfare (SPW), Fleet Support Operations (FSO), Construction (CON)
8COMCBPAC is the Commander, Construction Battalions, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
COMCBLAN'T is the Commander, Construction Battalions, L.S. Atlantic Fleet.
CBPAC and CBLANT are both Type Commanders (TYCOMs). This means that they
are responsible for the operational and administrative control of units under their
respective Service component commander's OPCON. Under CINCLANTFLT, for
example, there are four TYCOMs: SURFLANT, SUBLANT, AIRLANT and
CBLANT.
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and Noncombat Operations (NCO). Each of these PRMARs are reported by active
NCF units with the exception of FSO and NCO, since these involve service capabilities
which are measured indirectly by the other PRMARs.
TABLE 9
PROJECTED OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
FOR NMCB AND RNMCB UNITS
1. In foreign country in wartime.
2. Capable of performing horizontal and vertical
construction simultaneously.
3. Capable of staffing jobs for two ten-hour shifts,
seven days per week.
4. Capable of performing all defensive functions
simultaneously.
5. Capable of performing intermediate maintenance on own
equipment simultaneously with construction effort.
6. Construction and maintenance capabilities decrease as
defensive requirements increase.
7. Operate in climate extremes ranging from cold weather
to tropical to desert environments.
8. Operate independently or as part of an NCF Module
consisting of two or more NMCBs, one NCFSU, and one
NCR, with UTC support.
9. Capable of over the beach operations in support of
Fleet Marine Force amphibious assault.
The required operational capabilities and projected operational environment
vary between types of units. The degree of capability for each subset of the required
operational capabilities also varies from full to partial. Some capabilities such as
conducting dredging operations or performing railroad construction, (CON 4.8 and 4.9:
see Table 10), are required of one RNMCB unit only.
The Navy assigns missions to each unit and determines where the unit can be
employed by use of the projected operating environment statement. This then helps to
determine the durability and operating characteristics of the unit's equipment, its
facilities and the additional support items that will be required. An example of
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TABLE 10
REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR NMCB
AND RNMCB UNITS
Primary Mission Area: Construction (CON)
CON 1 - Perform tactical Construction.
CON 1. 1 Perform vertical construction including prefab
buildings, bunkers and towers.
CON 1. 2 Perform horizontal construction including
unpaved roads, airstrips, mat runways and helo
landing areas.
CON 1. 3 Construct utilities including power generation
and water purification systems.
CON 1. 4 Construct beach improvements, beach exits,
helopads, minor roads and camps.
CON 2 - Perform base construction.
CON 2. 1 Perform vertical construction including prefab
buildings, masonry and concrete buildings, and!
steel and concrete bridging.
CON 2. 2 Perform horizontal construction including
asphalt roads, asphalt and concrete runways,
and paved storage, staging and parking areas.
CON 2. 3 Construct utilities including central base
power plant, sewage and water systems, water
purification and desalination systems, and
wire communication systems.
CON 3 - Perform construction engineering.
CON 3. 1 Conduct surveying and drafting operations.
CON 3. 2 Conduct materials testing.
CON 3. 3 Perform planning and estimating.
CON 3. 4 Perform design for local expedient projects.
CON 4 - Perform specialized construction.
CON 4. 1 Conduct well drilling operations.
CON 4. 2 Conduct concrete batch plant operations.
CON 4. 3 Conduct concrete batch plant operations.
CON 4. 4 Conduct asphalt batch plant operations.
CON 4. 5 Conduct quarry operations.
CON 4. 6 Conduct rock crusher operations.
CON 4. 7 Conduct SeaBee team operations.
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TABLE 10
REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR NMCB
AND RNMCB UNITS (CONT'D.)
Primary Mi:ssion Area: Construction (CON) continued
CON 4. 8 Conduct dredging operations.
CON 4. 9 Perform railroad construction.
CON 4. 10 Conduct concrete block plant operations.
CON 4. 11 Conduct saw mill operations.
CON 4. 12 Conduct pile driving operations.
CON 4. 13 Perform pier and wharf construction.
additional support items is protective and special clothing. The projected operating
environment statement may also indicate the need for training which is related to the
possible operating environment of the unit, such as horizontal construction during
extreme cold weather conditions. The degree of independence and interoperability with
other forces is also indicated in the POE.
The required operational capabilities determine the types of equipment,
supplies, personnel and training needed to perform the mission. Taken together, the
POE and ROC detail the needed capabilities of a unit. Knowing the needed
capabilities can then help to determine the necessary investment in capital and human
assets. This is an appropriate methodology for linking desired outputs to the assets
which can produce them and to the budget dollars needed to procure those assets. By
decreasing or increasing a unit's required capabilities, the investment in that unit will
also vary although unlikely in the same proportion.
The degree to which a unit has attained its required operational capabilities is
determined by measuring the primary mission area's four resource categories. Thus for
the PRMAR of construction, only the equipment and supplies on hand, their
condition, the personnel and the training needed to perform construction are measured.
Once measured, a Mission Area Specific Resource rating (M-rating) is assigned to each
resource category. After all mission areas are evaluated and M-ratings are assigned, a
set of criteria is applied which determine the resource C-rating values. The resource C-
ratings in turn will determine the overall C-rating for the unit. The logic flow in






















































































































































































































Figure 4.1 UNITREP Preparation Worksheet for C-ratings.
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2. Mission Area Specific Resource Ratings
a. Equipment
To determine the mission area specific resource rating for the equipment
portion of the equipment and supplies on hand, only major end items, (i.e., CESE), are
counted. To be included in the count the end items must be physically held by a
reporting unit or its parent unit. If an item is to be shipped for overhaul or disposal, it
must be counted until it physically leaves the unit site. If the responsible TYCOM,
(CBPAC or CBLANT), sends notification that an end item has been shipped to a unit,
it will be counted as on hand. End items assigned to another unit will not be counted.
A determination of the percent of equipment on hand is made by adding up the
number of items on hand of specific equipment needed to perform a particular
PRMAR, and dividing by the total number specified by the wartime requirement. The
specific equipment, the cut off points and the associated M-ratings are obtained from
COMCBPAC/COMCBLANT Instruction 3501.1. Table 11 displays the PRMAR of
mobility and shows the required equipment as well as the conversion table for
determining the M-rating.
The primary mission areas of mobility, command, control and
communications, and special warfare use this methodology. For the primary mission
area of construction, there is an additional step required. The equipment identified for
construction is further segregated into four critical groups: transportation, MHE,
compressors/pumps/generators and earth moving. The criteria shown in Table 12 is
applied in order to obtain the equipment portion of the equipment and supplies on
hand resource for this PRMAR.
All other equipment and supplies in a unit's table of allowance are
considered to be the supplies on hand portion of the equipment and supplies on hand
resource. Supplies are considered to be on hand if they are physically held by a unit or
if they are on order and will be received within 90 days. Material which will take more
than 90 days before receipt is considered to have a long leadtime and is not included as
being on hand.
b. Supplies On Hand
A determination of the percent of supplies on hand is made by obtaining
the dollar value of material considered to be on hand and dividing by the total dollar
value of the wartime requirement. This wartime requirement can be found by
examining the appropriate sections of a unit's table of allowance. The applicable
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TABLE 11
ESTABLISHED CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING MISSION AREA
SPECIFIC RESOURCE RATINGS
Primary Mission Area: Mobility (MOB] !
EQUIPMENT/SUPPLIES ON HAND:
1. Equipment:
Equipment Description : ECCs: No:
TRK 3/4T UTILITY 030731, 010701 12
TRK 11/4T CARGO 036031, 034812 16
TRK STAKE 064301, 053901 20
TRK TRACTOR 064512, 060712
060701 10
TRK WRECKER 073021, 073011 2
SEMITRLR LB 40T 082512, 082600
082601, 082611
084201 13
TRLR 15T BOLST 084201 1
LOADER SCOOP WH 453109 4
LOADER SCOOP WH 453133, 453123 4
TRFK 4LB 133000, 130400
130600 5







2. Supplies: Compute rating based upon percent of TA-01
Sections 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 21, 22 and 25 on hand.





EQUIPMENT READINESS: Reevaluate rating determined in
the equipment portion of the Equipment and Suppdies
On Hand resource above. Items will be totaled after
being counted and wei ghed by their condition cc
line or otherwise not avai
des
below. Items on dead lable







EQUIPMENT M-RATING CRITERIA FOR PRIMARY MISSION AREA
OF CONSTRUCTION
A. The total P25 quantity is obtained from the basic
NMCB TA-01 dated 12 April 1985. The four critical
groups below can be found in greater detail in
COMCBPAC/COMCBLANT Instruction 3501. 1:
GROUP: QUANTITY:
1. Transportation 72
2. MHE, WHE 16
3. Compressors, pumps
and generators 28
4. Earth moving 69
B. RATINGS:
UNITS ON HAND: RATING:
TA-01 GRP-1 GRP-2 GRP-3 GRP-4
216-239 65-72 14-16 25-28 63-69 M/Cl
168-215 51-64 11-13 20-24 48-62 M/C2
144-167 44-50 9-10 17-19 41-61 M/C3
0-143 0-43 0- 8 0-16 0-40 M/C4
C. DETERMINATION OF EQUIPMENT ON HAND RATING:
1) Use total on hand rating if it equals or exceeds
any or all critical group ratings.
2) Use the worst critical group rating minus one if
only one critical group rating exceeds the total on
hand rating, or if two or more critical groups have
worse ratings than the P25 rating but do not satisfy
part C below.
3) Use the worst critical group rating if two or more
critical group ratings exceed the total on hand rating
and each of the worst critical groups have the same
rating.
sections of the TA, which are assigned to each PRMAR, are also specified by
COMCBPAC/COMCBLANT Instruction 3501.1. An example of this can also be seen
in Table 11. For further explanation of the composition and contents of a TA, a
portion of the 1985 NMCB Table of Allowance [Ref. 17] is included as an Appendix.
While equipment is evaluated independently of the supplies on hand, the worst rating
of either equipment or supplies is used to determine the mission area specific resource
rating for a PRMAR.
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c. Equipment Readiness
The mission area specific resource rating for the equipment readiness
resource is determined by computing a Mission Capable (MC) rate. The MC rate
calculation used by the NCF differs from that discussed in chapter II. Table 11 shows
the weights applied to equipment and the calculation required to determine this
weighted Mission Capable rate. Only the types and quantities of equipment specified
in the TA are used in the computation. Augment equipment, which is not part of the
basic allowance, may be counted for substitution purposes if it does not misrepresent
the actual state of readiness.
d. Unit Commander's Assessment
In addition to the direction received from higher authority, a commanding
officer of a unit has the prerogative to reduce a readiness rating if he feels that a
PRMAR has been degraded due to a deficiency not addressed in published criteria. If
this is done, an explanation must be included in part II of the UNITREP. Senior
commands are not authorized to change a subordinate unit's reported rating or to
change the criteria on which the report is based. These senior commands are, however,
authorized and required to evaluate subordinate commands on their adherence to the
published UNITREP reporting requirements.
By measuring the four primary missions of an NMCB, nearly all of the TA
is included in the calculations required to determine readiness. The exceptions are: tent
camp facilities, petroleum (POL), provisions (subsistence) and container requirements.
While POL and subsistence are not insignificant omissions, they are excluded because
each TYCOM has standby arrangements to obtain these requirements from
prepositioned stock located at supply depots and fuel farms. The tent camp facilities
are not considered a part of the active unit's allowance and these assets are held by
TYCOM representatives in warehouses located at unit deployment sites in Okinawa,
Guam, Porto Rico and Spain. Container requirements are not measured at present,
since operating units are capable of packing their supplies into battalion made wooden
mount out boxes. These units have not yet converted to ISO containers which are
being procured under contract.
This active NCF readiness reporting system was discussed first since it is
the most likely candidate for RNCF use. There are some drawbacks to using this
system without modification. These will be discussed in the next section while
examining another readiness reporting system that may prove useful.
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B. THE ARMY'S READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM
Since the Army was the first Service to develop a readiness reporting system, the
other services tended to pattern their systems after the Army model. As a result, the
UNTTREP system implemented by the JCS was to a large extent the product of Army
work, in the area of readiness measurement. The purpose of this system development
effort was to create a system:
to inform all levels of command of problems or trends which may degrade a
unit's ability to accomplish its assigned mission. [Ref. 3: p. 23]
The Army's readiness report and the UNITREP were not designed to be a
mechanism to convert funds appropriated by congress into increased unit readiness in a
direct fashion. In fact, they were not even intended to aid supply, personnel or training
experts in resource allocation decisions since other reports of a more detailed nature
were designed to do this. The UNITREP is, however, the only report which ties all
other readiness reports together. In this way it serves as one document to inform the
chain of command about the overall readiness posture of a unit.
The Army uses the criteria outlined in Chapter II and set down in JCS
Publication 6 to report readiness. This section will therefore only discuss differences
between the active NCF UNITREP format and that specified in Army Regulation
220-1, Field Organizations, Unit Status Reporting [Ref. 18].
The first major difference is that the Army readiness reporting system does not
require the computation of C-ratings based on mission area specific resource ratings.
The resource C-ratings are determined directly from the resources measured.
1. Equipment On Hand
For the equipment and supplies on hand resource, Army units only report the
status of selected equipment and determine a C-rating by comparing the quantities of
the selected equipment on hand to the wartime requirement. The Army uses a Table
of Organization and Equipment (TOE) or Modified TOE (MTOE) to prescribe the
mission, organizational structure, personnel and equipment requirements for its tactical
military units. The TOE is what Army doctrine prescribes for a particular type of unit.
The MTOE is what the Force Commander (FORSCOM) decides to actually outfit a
unit with based on the TOE. The TOE is in most respects similar to an NCF TA.
TOE units do not report either the status of supplies or repair parts on hand. This is
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because unit allowable stockage levels and prescribed load lists are based on peacetime
requirements. The items of equipment which are reported are determined by examining
the unit TOE and selecting those which are designated as items with Equipment
Readiness Code A (ERC-A). An ERC-A designator is given to a unit's primary
weapons and equipment. Examples of the various ERC categories can be seen in
Figure 4.2.
By not reporting the status of supplies or repair parts the Army is reporting
readiness in its narrowest sense. The Army's UNITREP does indicate which units are
ready but does not indicate the level of sustainability which these units possess. An
Army unit without supplies or repair parts can only operate until its limited subsistence
items are used up or the failures of equipment cannot be repaired due to a lack of
spare parts.
The NCF on the other hand includes in its TAs 90 days worth of
sustainability on supplies and repair parts, and 15 days for subsistence and fuel. The
investment required by the RNCF is increased if it must include 90 days sustainability
in the readiness calculation. An Army reserve unit with less sustainability than an
RNCF unit would probably report a higher readiness rating to the JCS.
2. Pacing Items
In addition to computing a percent of ERC-A items on hand versus the
wartime requirement, the Army has also incorporated specific unit type pacing items
into the readiness report. These pacing items (ERC-P) are considered to be the most
important pieces of equipment in a unit and were selected based on a prioritization of
all equipment and weapon systems authorized by unit type and reflected in the TOE.
For an armored tank battalion the pacing item is the tank. For an infantry battalion
the pacing items are the TOW and DRAGON launchers. Units may have several or
no pacing items. The pacing items for engineer units are shown in Table 13.
A composite C-rating is determined for all ERC-A and P items taken together,
and a C-rating is determined for each pacing item. The unit's overall equipment and
supplies on hand resource rating is equal to the lowest rating of either calculation
above.
This concept of pacing items is similar to that of critical groups used by the
NCF. Pacing items are only a few key items in an Army unit while NCF critical
groups include 185 of the 239 pieces of CESE. For the RNCF the main concerns
should be the physical weight of its CESE and whether there are sufficient quantities
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Table 8-2
Equipment readiness coda examples
Equipment
a. Communications equipment
(1) FM and HF voice command and control radios.
(2) FM and HF admin log net radios.
(3) Wire and associated equipment
(4) Radio telervpewnters ( FtATT).
(5) Multichannel radio equioment.
(6) COMSEC equipment.
(7) Radars.





(3) Crew served weapons
(Caliber .50 and under).
(4) Bayonets.
c. Vehicles.
(1) Command and control venicles.
(2) Combat tracked venicles.
(3) Recovery venicles.
(4) Vehicles, to include fuel tank trailers and cargo trailers, used
pnmanly for transport or POL or ammunition.
(5) Venicles Wat are used to oower ERC-A radios.
(6) Other vehicles.
d. Generators.
a. Night vision devices.
). Unit maintenance equipment
g. Camouflage neis.
h. NBC defense equipment
(1) Individual protective mask.
(2) Decontamination Apparatus. PDOA and LOS.





(6) Dosimeters and chargers.
(7) Collective protection.
(8) Smoke generators.
(9) Gas particulate filter units (GPFU)
i. ADPE ma/or item such as AN/MY4Q-4.
j. Petroleum handling equipment
(1) Petroleum laboratones.
(2) Collapsible POL storage bags, 10,000 gal and larger.




Tactical operations nets for maneuver Bngades. combat divisions.
corps, and other type maior command HO wnicn direct tactical
operations: combat amis units Isee note); and MP units. ERC-A. Also
ERC-A. soecific radios of supporting commanders whicn by doctnne
are required to be in a command net for example, division support
commander (OISCOM) and forward support battalion (FS8)
commander, in all otner units, code 3.
in all units, code 3.
In signal units, where wire and associated eouioment supports an
ERC-A system(s), code A. ;n ail other units, code 3.
In all units, code 3 (unless it is the pnmary means of communications).
in signal units, code a. In ail others, code 3.
Code will match radio supported.
In all units with pnmary mission of surveillance, code A. in ail others.
code 3.
Code will match radio supported.
In ail units, code A (except ceremonial).
In combat arms and MP units, code A. In all other units, code 3.
In combat arms and MP units, code A.
In all other units, code 3.
In infantry and Special Forces units, code A. in all other units, code 3.
In all units, code A (like vehicles >n a unit may reduire vanable coding;
for examoie. commander's vehicle code A. chaplain s code 3).
in all units, code A.
In maintenance units, code A. In ail others, code 3.
In all units, code A.
In all units, code A.
All units, vanaole coding.
If a sole power source tor a code A item, use code A. In all other units,
code 3.
in all units with a pnmary mission wnicn requires night surveillance
(Infantry, Armor, Aviation, and MP), code A. in all other units, code B.
In all units, code B.
In all units, code C.
In all units, code A.
In all medical units whose pnmary mission is decon. Code A. In all other
units, code 3.
in all units, code 3.
In NSC reconnaissance units, code A. In all other units, code S.
In NBC reconnaissance, decontamination, and medical units, code A. In
all other units, code B.
In NBC and other recon units, code A. In all other units, code 8.
In all units, code B.
In medical units, code A. In all other units, code B.
In units whose pnmary mission is smoke generation, code A. In all other
units, code 3.
In all units, code A.
In all units, code A.
In all petroleum lab units, code A. In all other units, code S.
In all supply and service (S&S), supply and transportation (S&T), and
POL supply operating companies, code A. In all other units, code 3.
Compat engineer and Special Operations Forces, code A. In all other
units, code 8.
In all units, code C.
In all units, code 3
In all units, code C.
Note:
Comoat arm* units are; infantry, armor, field artillery. Special Forces, engineer, air defense artillery, and aviation.
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Figure 4.2 Equipment Readiness Code Examples.
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on hand to perform its mission. Consideration should be given to incorporating
suitable substitute equipment, including conversion factors, which allow for a more
than one for one exchange. An example of this is the 15 ton dump truck which is
equivalent to three 5 ton vehicles.
3. Equipment Readiness
The Army equipment readiness resource rating is determined by computing
the Equipment Readiness (ER) rate. The ER rate is similar to the MC rate shown in
Chapter II. It measures the total days that equipment possessed by a unit was
available divided by the wartime required days for all equipment that a unit at full
strength would be authorized. This is also similar to the NCF MC rate measurement.
The difference between the Army's ER rate and the NCF's MC rate is that the Army
uses historical readiness data. For active Army units this means the data on
equipment for the past 30 days is used as a base to determine equipment readiness.
For the Army Reserves and National Guard units the base used is the past 90 days.
NCF units use a snapshot approach. The equipment readiness reported is the actual
equipment readiness as of the day the UNITREP is prepared. Prior equipment
readiness excellence or deficiencies are ignored.
The advantage of using historical equipment readiness is that it better
represents the probabilities of different types of equipment being operational when
needed in a contingency. During a mobilization though, Army units will report their
current readiness in the same manner as the NCF. Another advantage to using
historical readiness data in peacetime is that it shows trends in equipment maintenance
management, reliability and supply support. Measuring only current readiness can
mask the fact that a piece of equipment has been down for 29 of the last 30 days and
only up on the day the UNITREP was prepared.
There is a clear advantage for the RNCF to report its equipment readiness in
the same manner as the Army rather than the active NCF. Since the information on
CESE and ER will be provided to RNCF units by the Civil Engineer Support Office
rather than the units determining the rating for themselves, this more informative
historical readiness can be a partial substitute for the real-time familiarity with the
equipment which is enjoyed by the active forces.
4. Equipment Mission Capable Rate
In addition to measuring equipment readiness based on the wartime
requirement, Army units also measure an Equipment Mission Capable (EMC) rate.
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TABLE 13
PACING ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT FOR ARMY ENGINEER UNITS
UNIT TYPE
ENGINEER:
Engineer Bn, Abn Div.
8
Engineer Bn, Cbt, Corps
Engineer Cbt Bn, Mech,
Corps










10)Engineer Co, aslt fit
bridge, ribbon
ll)Engineer Co, Inf Bde,
MAS





15) Engineer Bn, ARMD/MECH
Div
16)Engineer Bn, Inf Div
17)Engineer Bn, Pipeline
Construction
18)Engineer Cbt Bn, Abn
PACING ITEMS
Tractor . full-tracked; truck
dump 5 ton; truck, dump 5/2
ton and loader scoop, 5/2 CY.
Truck, tractor M916, semi-
trailer, low bed 40 ton;
tractor, full-tracked; and
truck, dump 5 ton.
APC,M113: semitrailer, 40 ton
; truck, tractor M916; and
tractor full-tracked.
Tool kit, spec weapons; radio
set AN/PRC-77; radio set,
control grp, AN/GRA-39; and
truck, cargo 5/2 ton.
Grader, road motorized:
loader scoop, 5/2 CY; tractor
full tracked; and truck, dump
5 ton.
End bay, MAB; interior bay
MAB; transporter, MAB; and
bridge erection boat, 27 FT.
Medium girder bridge assets
and truck, dump 5 ton.
Panel (Bailey) bridge assets
and truck, dump 5 ton.
Bridge erection boat, 27 FT;
class 60 components; truck,
stake 5 ton; and compressor,
250 CFM.
Bridge erection boat, 27 FT;
interior bay, float bridge;
ramp bay. float bridge; and
transporter , float bridge.
End bay, MAB; interior bay,
MAB; and transporter , MAB.
CEV; AVLB; APC,M113; and
tractor, full-tracked.
CEV; AVLB; APC,M113; and
tractor, full-tracked.
Crane trk Mtd,25 ton; crane
shovel 40 ton: tractor, full
tracked; and truck, tractor.
APC,M113; AVLB; CEV; and
loader scoop 5/2 CY.
Truck, dump 5 ton; CEV; and
loader scoop 5/2 CY.




Loader scoop, 5/2 CY;
tractor . full-tracked; truck,
dump, 5 ton; and scraper, 11CY
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An EMC rate is calculated by adding the days that equipment on hand is available and
dividing by the number of possible days that it could have been available. EMC rates
expressed as a percentage were developed to disregard that portion of the required
equipment that a unit does not have. Figure 4.3 shows a sample format for Army ER
and EMC rate calculations.
2. Nan~avlatlon unit: 1/ througn j*/
Line Item Sec) Ch-ftand Avallaole daya PoaalOle 'lay
a
Required days
Carrier, Ml 13 13
Carrier , M577A1 7
Tame, K60A2(PI) 5*


























3Ct • Avallaole Daya - 1823 .90 x 100 - 90*
roaalOie -*>a 2030




.904 x 100 - 901 (H60A2 la only pacing, item.)
EM • Available Dava
nequired -aya
1823 .731 x ICO 731 • C-2





.35^4 x 100 - 851 • C-2 (M60A2 la only pacing item.)
Figure 4.3 Sample Format for ER and EMC Rating Calculations.
The difference between a unit's EMC rate and its ER rate can be of
significance to military planners:
One significant feature of this measurement is the idea that it is a difference value
between an intended performance level, i.e., a standard, and the actual
performance level that tne unit is capable of. {sic} This use of a difference value
as a measure has a number of benefits including the focusing of management
attention on the gap that must be closed bv management action or by additional
resources. It also gives the managers the feel for what is required to change the
readiness level if it is unacceptable. A single value of unit readiness does not
have this feature. [Ref. 19: p. jO]
There are obvious reasons for incorporating an EMC rating into the RNCF
UNITREP. The EMC rating can provide an indication of the condition of the
equipment that a snapshot may obscure. It also separates out the condition of the
equipment on hand versus the wartime requirement. This added information can be
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used to help satisfy the needs of both the resource sponsors and the RNCF
organization.
5. Unit Commander's Assessment
The overall C-rating for an Army unit is calculated subjectively by unit
commanding officers. While the Navy, and the NCF in specific, requires the overall C-
rating to be equal to the lowest resource area C-rating, the Army allows leeway in
making this determination:
The start point for determining the overall status of a unit is the lowest unit
status ratine attained in a measured resource area (personnel, EOH. ER. or
training). However, the overall C-rating mav vary from the lowest measured
resource area rating unless one or more "of the areas is measured as C-5. If no
resource is rated af C-5, the commander can subjectively upgrade or downgrade
the unit's overall rating if the calculated rating is not tru'ely representative of the
status of the unit. For example, if the education level, qualitv of leadership,
morale, or cohesion in a unit are unusually high a commanded mav want to
subjectively upgrade the unit's overall rating. On the other hand, if the shortage
of certain 'eqUipment items is having a greater impact on the unit than the
calculated EOH rating indicates, the commander mav want to subjectively
downgrade the unit's overall rating. Calculated resource" area ratings cannot be
subjectively changed. [Ref. 18: p. t5]
While unit commanders may subjectively raise their unit's overall C-rating,
senior commanders may also append remarks to these reports. The senior commanders
may not however change any rating as the reports progress up the chain of command.
Units which report an overall C-4 or C-5 rating are required to submit
Mission Accomplishment Estimates (MAEs). The MAE is the unit commander's
estimate of the extent to which the unit can accomplish its wartime mission if it were
to be deployed as of the date of the UNITREP. The MAE is expressed as a
percentage of the wartime mission that can be accomplished. It is included in Part II
of a UNITREP as part of the remarks and is intended to provide a more definitive
estimate of the ability of a unit to perform its wartime mission than an overall rating of
C-4 or C-5 can provide.
The ability to raise an overall C-rating may or may not be appropriate for an
RNCF unit. The MAE, however, is worthwhile including in Part II of a UNITREP
because it provides an additional assessment of a unit's readiness.
The element of subjectivity is present in any system that tries to measure and
quantify an intangible such as readiness. The Army recognizes this in their overall C-
rating and in the MAE. If subjectivity is not allowed at the unit level to some extent,
it must be recognized that subjective assumptions are then being made, (by default), at
higher levels by the designers of the readiness measurement system.
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C. SUMMARY
In summary the major differences between the active NCF and Army readiness
reporting systems is that the Army does not evaluate units based on mission area
specific resources but measures each resource area directly. The Army does not
measure or report supplies and repair parts in a UNITREP while the NCF does. The
Army uses a pacing item approach to evaluate selected key equipment where the NCF
measures 77% of its CESE as part of its mission area specific resources. The mission
capable assessment for equipment readiness is based on historical readiness in the
Army and based on a snapshot approach in the NCF. The Army allows the unit
commanding officers to subjectively upgrade or downgrade a unit's overall C-rating
while NCF commanding officers may only downgrade a unit's rating.
The active NCF reports equipment on hand versus the wartime requirement
because the wartime requirement is the baseline, while Army units report equipment
based on current assets as well as wartime requirements. Army units reporting an
overall C-4 or C-5 rating must include a narrative assessment and mission
accomplishment estimate in the UNITREP while NCF units do not.
An advantage to the Army approach is that readiness is less costly to attain since
it reflects only readiness and does not include sustainability. Another advantage is that
the incorporation of a subjective assessment allows incremental gains in resources to be
reflected if they materially affect the overall readiness of a unit. A disadvantage of the
Army's system is that readiness can become unreadiness if the sustainability is not
added in short order by a responsive and flexible logistics system. An advantage of the
NCF readiness system is that it is a more rigorous approach to measuring readiness. It
is however a system which relies on the dollar value of material to reflect its military
worth and this is not always the case. The Army's ERC-A and P items are more
reflective of the critical equipment needed to perform a unit's mission. The negative
part of measuring only critical equipment is that this equipment can not stand alone
and requires the support of non-critical components in order to perform.
The next chapter will introduce a model which can be used to correct some of
these deficiencies and can be used by the RNCF to help determine the contribution to
readiness made by prepositioning war reserve material stock.
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their place. When requirements change, PWRMS assets can then be either reapplied
to other CNO special projects or used to generate reinvestment funds. In essence this
means that PWRMS assets which are not reapplied to other CNO special projects can
be used to satisfy peacetime demands. The funds generated from these sales are then
used to satisfy new or higher priority PWRMR which are financed by the Navy Stock
Fund.
CESO was granted a waiver from the normal management of PWRMS by OP-04,
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for Logistics, to allow the RNCF
assets to be containerized. By granting this waiver, recognition was given that the
RNCF requirement would be continuing and not subject to change for the foreseeable
future. This waiver meant that the RNCF PWRMS assets could not be restratified
and applied against other PWRMR. Restratification is the process where PWRMS
assets are identified to a specific CNO special project. If a higher priority project is
initiated then assets of lower priority projects will be reassigned if funds are not
otherwise available. The waiver effectively prevented this from occuring but did not
grant any exemption from the normal Navy stockage policy for PWRMS. As a result,
a decision was made by NAVSUPSYSCOM that the RNCF assets, which are now
being procured, will not be line item reportable as PWRMS. Only the total dollar
value of the material is to be reported.
There is as yet no agreement between NAVSUP and NAVFAC on whether the
unpurchased and deferred material will continue to remain as PWRMR or will be
transfered to Other War Reserve Material Requirements (OWRMR). If this material
is reclassified as OWRMR, as NAVSUP wants, it means that the RNCF will not
receive any additional material until after all other initial mobilization requirements are
filled. OWRMR, as was noted in Chapter III, is that group of material which
represents additional requirements to support a second prescribed period of time
following mobilization. This means that the RNCF will most likely be precluded from
carrying out its mission.
The problem, as it has defined itself, is now to determine the effect that funding
constraints and stockage policies have on limiting the readiness of the RNCF. One
method is to use the Procurement Leadtime9 (PCLT) of the material which is not
currently stocked as PWRMS.
yPCLT = PLT + ALT. PLT is production leadtime. ALT is administrative
leadtime.
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Figure 5.1 shows a pictorial representation of a procurement leadtime. This is the
time that it takes from the initial registering of demand until the item is manufactured
and delivered to the ordering activity. As can be seen in the figure, this period includes
the administrative leadtime for processing the order. The PCLT can be used to help
determine if individual RNCF units can have sufficient material on hand to operate
successfully according to JCS readiness reporting criteria by their mobilization




ALT 2 PLT 3
>i >i
1) A buy is generated.
2) A contract is awarded.
3) First receipt of material by an ordering activity.
Figure 5.1 Components of Procurement Leadtime.
The first assumption is that there won't be adequate stocks of material in the
supply system to satisfy all mobilization requirements. Based on the material with
which the RNCF is concerned and which is not being considered for stockage by the
supply system, this assumption is reasonable. The second assumption is that the
peacetime procurement leadtime approximates the initial wartime procurement
leadtime. This second assumption is also reasonable since there will be new but
opposing influences affecting the procurement leadtime. While industry will require
time to increase its production capacity, it will be able to divert stocks destined for
other customers to DOD. At the same time, the contracting agencies will be inundated
with procurement requests which will offset the time saved by diverted industry stocks.
If these assumptions are reasonably valid it is then possible to proceed.
Data on procurement leadtimes are maintained at Inventory Control Points
(ICPs) such as the Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) and the Aviation Supply Office
(ASO) for the Navy. Other DOD ICPs such as the Defense Construction Supply
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Center (DCSC) and the Defense General Supply Center (DGSC) also maintain PCLT
and other data on materials they manage.
It is necessary to understand how this data is collected and transformed before
showing how it can be used in readiness reporting. The goal of the next section is to
show how procurement leadtimes and their variability are developed and used by ICPs
to make predictions about future events.
B. UNIFORM INVENTORY CONTROL PROGRAM
The Navy's wholesale inventory program, known as the Uniform Inventory
Control Program (UICP), is maintained by FMSO and used by both SPCC and ASO.
In a demand based inventory model such as UICP, historical procurement leadtimes
are collected along with the demands for material in order to determine reorder levels
for the items carried in stock. The reorder level is thus a function of the forecasted
demand over a procurement leadtime. This can be seen in Equation 5.1 where demand
is the quarterly demand average and leadtime is average procurement leadtime in
quarters. Both the procurement leadtime and demand are random variables. They
contain risk for an inventory control point concerned with running out of stock.
Reorder Level = forecasted Demand * forecasted Leadtime (eqn 5.1)
In the case of the RNCF, knowing the average procurement leadtime alone is
insufficient information on which to base a decision. Two other items are important
considerations. The first is whether an average PCLT is a good indicator of the future
PCLT and the second is the variability of the PCLT. The average procurement
leadtime by itself only conveys the information that half of the time material was
ordered and received by the PCLT.
For the sake of simplicity, if the average PCLT was based on only two
observations where the first observation was 10 days and the second was 90 days, then
the material which was ordered could have arrived in 50 days plus or minus 40 days.
Knowing the variability or standard deviation (<T ) is essential when a management
decision is being made on when to order or, on whether or not, to preposition stock for
a mobilization contingency. The same level of importance can be attached to knowing
the forecasted PCLT and standard deviation. With the added information of the
standard deviation of a PCLT, a confidence interval can then be established which
provides a predetermined level of acceptable risk.
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To determine the standard deviation of a PCLT it is necessary to compute the
probability-weighted average of squared deviations from the mean of the PCLT
population as can be seen in Equation 5.2. The UIC program however does not
compute <r . Instead, it uses an approximation called the Mean Absolute Deviation
(MAD). Equation 5.3 shows the formula for the MAD calculation. The mean
absolute deviation is the UICP proxy for a and assumes that (7 = (1.25) * MAD.
<*y= V{£ (7i • Hy)
2/(n-l)}, (eqn5.2)
where u = E(Y) and y. = ith PCLT observation
MAD = ( £ | y- - u |)/n, for i = 1 to n (eqn 5.3)
Since LTCP is a semiautomatic system, some filter values are incorporated into
the program code which screen out individual PCLT and PLT observations that do not
fall within ICP specified parameters. An example of the parameters established by
SPCC can be seen in Equations 5.4 and 5.5.
0.5(old average forecasted PLT) < (observation) < 2.0(old average forecasted
PLT) (eqn 5.4)
0.5(old average forecasted PCLT) < (observation) < 2.0(old average forecasted
PCLT) (eqn 5.5)
If either or both of the values for a PCLT and PLT fall outside of the
parameters, they are sent by a computer generated report to the item manager who
must validate and re-input the data to the system. If this is not done, both the PCLT
and PLT will be discarded and not used in any further calculation.
When a cyclic levels and forecasting program is run each quarter, a new average
PCLT is calculated using procurement leadtime data which has made it past the filters
or was re-input by the item manager. As can be seen in Equation 5.6 the new average
PCLT is expressed in terms of quarters.
average PCLT = (£ PCLTj)/(91n), for i = 1 to n (eqn 5.6)
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The new PCLT is then used to forecast the next quarter's PCLT by use of an
exponential smoothing technique. As was stated by Sullivan in An Analysis of Demand
Forecasting Emphasizing Inventory Effectiveness:
the widespread appeal, among industry and the militarv, for the exponential
smoothing technique is apparent. To utilize exponential' smoothing a manager
need have only three data elements: the most recent observation, the^most recent
forecast and a weighting parameter. This data storage consideration has been of
primarv importance to multi-item inventory systems where demand forecasts are
routine'lv prepared for several thousand items'. Combining such features as low
data processing and storage costs together with high applicability, exponential
smoothing appears as a rational choice for the "Naw s forecasting method.
[Ref. 21: p. 7f
The use of this technique can be seen in Equation 5.7 where a new average
forecasted PCLT is developed. To a large extent the a-values affect the accuracy of
the forecast and should be chosen by sensitivity analysis for each line item of
inventory. The reality, as can be seen in Table 14, is that the same values are assigned
to all items managed by a Navy ICP. The important point to note here is that the a-
values at SPCC are dependent on the age of the last PCLT observation and more
weight is given to the current PCLT as the previous observation ages.
new average forecasted PCLT =
(a)(new average PCLT) + (1 - a)(old average forecasted PCLT), (eqn 5.7)
where < a < 1
TABLE 14
ALPHA (a) VALUES FOR EXPONENTIAL SMOOTHING IN UICP
ICP:
1-2
TIME SINCE LAST OBSERVATION:
qtrsqtrs 3-4 qtrs 4 or more
ASO 0. 5 0. 5 0. 5
SPCC 0. 2 0. 5 1.
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A new forecasted MAD for the PCLT (MAD k) is then developed. This
calculation also uses exponential smoothing and the same a-values as the PCLT.
Equations 5.8 and 5.9 show how the forecasted MAD is computed. Equation 5.9 is
used by SPCC when a = 1 which means, that when the last observed PCLT is more
than four quarters old, full weight is given to the new forecasted PCLT.
new forecasted MAD . =
(a)(|new average PCLT - old average PCLT|) + (eqn 5.8)
(1 - a )(old forecasted MAD dt ). ifa *
New forecasted MAD ,, =
pelt
0.051(new forecasted PCLT)' 884 , if a = or 1 (eqn 5.9)
As a forecasting tool the exponential smoothing technique is moderately
successful. Other techniques such as the Box-Jenkins method or Regression analysis
are more desirable and effective but also demand a great deal more storage capacity
and computer time. The reality of the Navy's LTC program is that it balances the
benefits of accurately predicting customer demands against the costs of operating the
system. A key point is that forecasted PCLT and MAD can be used with a
satisfactory degree of confidence for making predictions. In addition this is the only
type of PCLT data available to the RNCF, with the exception of local procurements,
for use in determining a unit's ability to prepare by a mobilization deployment date.
C. A MODEL FOR DETERMINING THE EXPECTED MATERIAL
READINESS OF RNCF UNITS
For each item of material which is not currently in PWRMS a confidence level
can be established for the likelihood that the material will be received by a specified
date, once it is ordered. This can be done by use of a normal table Z-value. The
normal table is being used as an approximation to the underlying distribution. No
claim, however, is made that the true distribution of the population is normal.
Unfortunately the data required to obtain the true distribution is not yet available,
since the population of material which will be stocked is not known with any degree of
certainty. Table 15 shows the Z-values and associated level of confidence which equate
to the C-ratings for the supplies on hand portion of the equipment and supplies on
hand resource. Figure 5.2 displays a normal population histogram with an area of risk
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shown in shade. By adding Z standard deviations to the mean of a normal population,
a level of confidence that the material to be ordered will be received in the calculated
time can be achieved.
Equation 5.10 shows the calculation for a 90% level of confidence using a known
mean and standard deviation. Equation 5.11 shows the substitution of the forecasted
PCLT and MAD figures into Equation 5.10.
TABLE 15
Z-VALUES AND THE ASSOCIATED C-RATINGS
z Confidence Risk C-Rating
1. 65 90% 10% C-l
1. 29 80% 20% C-2
. 94 65% 35% C-3
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The ordinate represents the probability density.
The areas under the graph represent tail probabilities
with P representing the probability of an occurance
and Q representing the risk.
Figure 5.2 Normal Distribution Histogram with Risk..
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X = u + 1.65 (<J ), where X is time in quarters (eqn 5.10)
for a 90% chance of material being received.
X = (forecasted average PCLT) + 1.65(1.25 * forecasted MAD dt) (eqn 5.11)
By determining the number of days that a unit has until it deploys after a general
mobilization is declared and adding to this the expected number of days prior to a
mobilization 11 that the requisitions for deficient material will be entered into the
system, the total time available to fill deficiencies can be determined. If this number of
days is then subtracted from the confidence value established in Equation 5.11, (which
must also be converted into days), then an expected days short value can be found and
used to select candidates for stockage, or for intensive management during
mobilization.
The concept of applying a probability distribution for each item's PCLT can also
be used in another way. If a unit had no material on hand and began ordering at some
point prior to mobilization, then the expected quantities of material on hand at
mobilization can be estimated. This is done by summing the calculated probabilities of
receiving each item ordered, within the time constraint, after multiplying by the items
dollar value. An example of this can be seen in Table 16.
The purpose for weighting the material not stocked by its dollar value is that this
is currently how the NCF weights its supplies on hand in its UNITREP calculations.
A more appropriate method for determining readiness would be to assign an
essentiality code to each item as was discussed in Chapter IV. This essentiality code
could then act as an additional weighting factor and the results would more accurately
reflect the relative importance of an item. In addition, different weights may be given
to the same material. An example of this would be to weight items in kits or
assemblies with one value and weight the same items found in the Central Tool Room
(CTR) as spares with a lesser value.
Since the PWRMS assets of the RNCF will be configured to unit sets and will be
filled on an OPLAN-based priority listing, as was shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, those
units which are scheduled to deploy first will be the ones with the most material
It is expected that there will be some period of increasing hostilities which will
provide an advance warning that a general mooilization is likely to occur. It is normal
to assume that some supply requisitions may be made prior to mobilization based on
the belief that the RNCF will be mobilized.
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TABLE 16
VALUE WEIGHTED PROBABILITIES COMPUTATION
Item Value Probabi 1 Lty Expected Value
1 6. 00 X . 10 = . 60
2 7. 00 X . 20 = 1. 40
3 1. 00 X . 50 = . 50
4 12. 00 X 1. 00 = 12. 00
5 4. 00 X . 40 = 1. 60
30. 00 16. 10
16.10 / 30.00 = 53.67% is the probability weighted
expected percentage or ordered material to be
received.
prepositioned. When computing a dollar value weighted probability of receiving
material by the mobilization deployment date for individual units, the varying amounts
of material on hand for each unit can be taken into account by assigning a probability
of 1.00 to these items. An example of this can be seen in item four of Table 16. A
probability of 1.00 reflects the fact that there is no risk involved and the item's
availability is deterministic.
As stated previously, this model can be used to determine the probability
weighted expected value of the material on hand by the mobilization deployment date
once the underlying population distribution of the PCLTs is known with some degree
of confidence. This data is not as readily available as is the UICP forecasted average
PCLT or the UICP forecasted MAD
lt
. The actual distribution is also not known or
used in UICP by the Navy inventory control points. Knowing the UICP forecasted
PCLT can at least provide some guidance to allocating incremental funds to long
leadtime material which would not be expected to arrive prior to a unit's mobilization
deployment date. In any event, the UICP forecasted PCLT by itself represents a
sample mean from the current population and is adjusted by exponential smoothing to
achieve a time-weighted moving average of the PCLT population. If a sufficiently
large sample of means is extracted from a population, the Central Limit Theorem
states that the sampling distribution of these means will be normal [Ref. 22: p. 259].
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As a final point on the use of this model, if the expected dollar value of material
on hand is calculated and divided by the total dollar value of a unit's TA, then a
probability weighted expected percent of material on hand can be determined. This
can be seen at the bottom of Table 16. A probability weighted expected percent of
material on hand can also be calculated which is based on the assumption that there is
currently no material on hand. These calculations can be done for each unit and the
difference between the two percentages should provide a good indication of how much
readiness was purchased by prepositioning war reserve material stock.
If NAVSUP succeeds in transfering the RNCF PWRMR to OWRMR then the
assumptions used in this model will most likely be invalid. In this case RNCF units
will have to either deploy with the material on hand or wait until after all other units'
PWRMR requirements are ordered. This means that the RNCF's resource C-ratings
will not improve from what they will be on the date of the transfer until well after a
general mobilization is announced.
D. SUMMARY
The conclusions and recommendations for ascertaining and reporting RNCF
readiness to the JCS were included in Chapter I for the convenience of the reader and
will not be repeated here. It is hoped that this thesis has provided insight into the
nature of readiness and will assist the Reserve Naval Construction Force to some
degree in achieving an accurate readiness assessment.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1) Once the RNCF PWRMS material from the current buy is received and
system cancellations and shortages are determined, the National Stock
Numbers (NSNs) can be screened against ICP data bases to select the PCLT
data needed to determine the true population distribution of PCLTs. This
model can then be tested to see if a normal curve can be fitted to the overall
population to accurately determine the expected value of material on hand by
the mobilization deployment date of each unit.
2) Essentiality coding can be used to determine an essentiality weighted dollar
value for each item within an RNCF TA. This can be done by a subjective
assessment methodology such as Saaty's Analytic Hierarchy Process [Ref. 23].
Excellent decision assisting computer software is available. For example,
Expert Choice [Ref. 24] can help in making the trade-ofis and pair-wise
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comparisons needed to arrive at the weightings. By determining an essentiality
weighted dollar value for TA items, a more accurate assessment of readiness
can be achieved.
3) Pacing items of CESE can be selected for each unit type within the RNCF in
a manner similar to that done for each type of Army unit. The methodology
for selecting pacing items was developed by the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis
Agency in Washington, D.C. Pacing items can be selected and used to
determine their effect on RNCF unit readiness and whether their inclusion will
more accurately portray RNCF readiness.
4) Unit tables of allowance can be screened to remove sustainability items from
readiness computations. This will then allow a readiness computation to be
made which is equivalent to that used by Army units. The effect on readiness
of including sustainability can be determined and reported separately in Part
II of an RNCFUNTTREP.
69
APPENDIX
NCF TABLE OF ALLOWANCE, INTRODUCTION AND
REPRESENTATIVE EXCERPTS
This appendix is intended to serve as a brief introduction to an NMCB/RXMCB
table of allowance.
This appendix was extracted from the 1985 NMCB TA-01 [Ref. 17]. Pages 71
through 80 introduce the table of allowance and explain its purpose, authority and
organization. Pages 81 through 84 show the air echelon portion of the construction
tools and equipment, (section 6), by group and facility. Pages 85 through 88 show one
of the groups, a four man plumbers kit (group 80001) and the national stock numbered
items of which it is composed.
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NCF TOA INTRODUCTION
1. PURPOSE. The purpose of the Table of Allowance (TOA) is to identify and
quantify the basic personnel, material, and equipment for the performance of
the unit's mission (s) in contingency/wartime/disaster recovery operations.
The TOA is designed to sustain construction operations for 90 days, except for
fuel a-nd subsistence, which are limited in the TOA to 15 days support.
NOTE: Ammunition is not listed within NCF TOAs, and is managed in accordance
with fleet directives. CINCLANTFLTINST C8010.4 series and COMNAVLOGPACINST
8015.1 series refer.
2. AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES. Commands having authority and
responsibility for TOAs are as follows
:
a. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO-Code OP 44) is responsible for
the doctrine and policy for all NCF units. CNO approves all NCF TOAs and any
changes that impact on the unit's mission.
b. The Chief of Civil Engineers (NAVFAC-Code 06) is responsible for
advising CNO (OP 44) in TOA matters concerning mission and state-of-the art
technological advances.
c. Fleet Commanders (COMCBPAC/COMCBLANT) are responsible for
recommending revisions to TOAs under their cognizance.
d. The Civil Engineer Support Office (CESO) is the system manager
responsible for maintaining NCF TOAs, developing new allowances as directed by
COMNAVFACENGCOM, and collecting field recommendations for revisions to
existing TOAs.
3. UPDATING TOAs. Publication and distribution of NCF TOAs and related
management aids are on a bi-annual update cycle (NAVFACINST 4423. IB applies).
4. GENERAL TOA INFORMATION. NCF allowances provide personnel, material and
equipment to enable the unit to carry out operational requirements. Since the
unit will be expected to build any number of different facilities in any
climatic condition, judicious selection of items is necessary to prevent the
allowance from reaching excessive proportions. A compromise must be reached,
balancing bulk against capability. The NCF Allowance represents the best
selection for providing general construction capability, but they are not all
inclusive. They are not, nor should they be, capable of meeting every
conceivable operational requirement. When an assigned project requires tools
or equipment in excess of the unit's capability, the allowance is supplemented
by augmentation. Augment tools, equipment and/or personnel may come from the
Naval Construction Force Support Unit (NCFSU), or be provided by the
responsible fleet or operational commander.
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5. ABFC/TOA STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION. Individual line items of material and
equipment are identified by stocx number, either National Stock Number (NSN)
or Navy Item Control Number (NICN). Stock numbers for Civil Engineer Support
Equipment (CESE) are listed within Equipment Cost Codes (ECCs). Other stock
numbers are assembled within functional ASSEMBLIES. ASSEMBLIES are arouped
functionally into either GROUPS or FACILITIES. GROUPS and FACILITIES are
segregated by major category or material into SECTIONS, and by purpose into
ECHELONS, within NCF TOAs and/or Advance Base Functional Component (ABFC)
System Components.
a. ABFC CCMPONENT/NCF ~CA. An ABFC Component/NCF TOA is a design for
personnel, ina-eriai ana eouicment required to perform specific taskings
delineated in CPNAVINST 5450.- series instructions. Comoonents and TOAs are
given names to indicate their functions, and unclassified codes consisting of
fetter (alpna) and number combinations. For example: a .'^aval Mobile
Construction 3attalion (NMC3) in the NCF TOA system is designated "TA-01", and
has an ABFC counterpart designated "P-25". The Naval Construction Force
SuDport Units (NCFSU) TOA is designated "TA-13", and has an ABFC counterpart
"P-31".
b. ECHELONS. In both contingency and day-to-day operations, an NCF
unit may be required to suDport, simultaneously, multiple projects, tasks and
locations. Preplanning for sucn contingencies and management of resources
required to suDport these ooerations are aided by " echeloning' certain "!"OAs.
For example, the NMC3 TOA is ecneloned into an Air Detacnment, an Air Echelon
(Minus Air Det), ana a Sea Echelon. This echeloning is based on anticipated
prioritization of personnel, material and equipment, and availability of
airlift versus sealift support. The NCFSU TOA is echeloned to augment and
suDport various special operations which are beyond the organic capability of
the NMC3s.
(1) Echelons are indicated by the ALPHA suffix code in the GROUP
numbering system explained below in paragraph 5.d (1).
c. SECTIONS. NCF allowances are divided into Sections, which are an
indication or major categories of material. Sections are two digit numbers,
numbered from 01 to 26, as shown in Illustration I below.
d. GROUPS/FACILITIES. GROUPS and FACILITIES are on the same level in
regard to the structural organization of Components and TOAs. They are coded
with 5 numerics, followed by 1 or 2 alpha codes.
(1) GROUPS are functional subdivisions of SECTIONS (major
categories of material). In the NCF TOA system, each digit of the group
number has meaning as delineated below and shown in Illustration I.
(a) The first digit is alway s "0".
(b) The second and third digits indicate the SECTION (major
category of material).
(c) The fourth digit indicates the Material Management Code
(MMC). Material Management Codes have been assigned in order for the computer
program to generate the specific documents/management aids required for
efficient management of TOA assets. (See paragraph 6 below for amplification
on TOA documents/management aids available.)
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(d) The fifth digit in the GROUP number is arbitrarily assigned
and is a sequential number utilized to subdivide material within a Section by
organizational interest. (In Section 02, Group Sequence Number "1" may aoply
Number "1to material in rne Armory, while in section 05, Group Sequence
apply to material for ALFA Company.)
may
(e) The sixth digit in the GROUP number is an ALPHA character
indicating the applicable NCF TOA (TA-##). Only those allowances which have
been "echeloned" have an additional ALPHA character as a seventh digit
indicating -the ECHELON.
EXAMPLES


























ILLUSTRATION I NCF TOA GROUP NUMBERING SYSTtM
M H N N A A (N=Numeric, A=Alpha)
First Hi git Always "O 1
SECTION Codes (01 - 25)
01 PERSONNEL
02 WEAPONS .& INFANTRY EQUIPMENT
03 C3R, DAMAGE CONTROL & SAFETY
04 ADMIN & GENERAL SZ^KZS
05 MAINTENANCE & SHOP TOOLS/EQUIP
06 CONSTRUCTION TOOLS/EQUIPMENT
07 CONSTRUCTION CONSUMABLES
08 MOUNTOUT RELATED MATERIALS
09 CLOTHING i 8EDDING (GREENS)
10 MEDICAL i DENTAL
11 COMMUNICATIONS S ELECTRONICS
12 FORMS I PUBLICATIONS
13 DIVING EQUIPMENT 3 SUPPLIES
14 WATERFRONT, SMALL CRAFT 5 MARINE
15 FACILITIES F/ECH (AIR DET)
16 FACILITIES F/ECH (AIR ECHELON)
JA & ECEHLON Codes
(As applicable)
Examples
AD NMCB Air Det
G3 PHIBCB Blue Beach






NO TOA Aids Provided
1 CTR Controlled Kits
(Kit Inventory Listings)
(No 1114 Cards available
f/Kits)





and 1075 cards provided)
3 Equipage
No Aids provided, however
listings and cards are
available.
4 Operating Space Items
(OSI) (INDIVIDUAL
Assembly Lists)
No cards are provided
17 FACILITIES F/ECH (SEA ECHELON)
18 FACILITIES F/ECH (AS SPECIFIED!
5 Operating Space Items
(OSI) (Separate
GROUP MTOs are provided.




Group MTOs, and 1114s are
provided. No 1075s are
provided.
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19 SCHOOLS (NCTC) TRAINING EQUIP
20 CIVIL ENGINEER SUPPORT EQUIP (CESE)
21 FACILITIES
22 FACILITIES SUPPORT MATERIAL
23 PETROLEUM/OIL/LUBRICANTS (POL)
2* PROVISIONS (SUBSISTENCE)
25 CESE REPAIR PARTS (COSALS)
26 ISO CONTAINER REQUIREMENTS
*NOTE: Additional Inventory Aids are available and are listed below. These Aids
will be provided upon request only.
7 Central Storeoom (CSR)
(Combined MTO, 1114s £
1075 cards provided.
)
8 MMC Not Currently
Assigned








3T< ROXf™ TITLE SEQUENCE
215=2001 I -I | NAVSUP 1139 CAROS FOR ASSY OTHER THAW KITS ASSY, HUN, SUWASY





3")^4-5!01 -\ A NAVSUP 1114 STOCK RECORD CAROS FOR
ASSEMBLY OTHER THAN KITS
ASSY, Nll.'l, SUT'A.RY
8355CR01 1 - fill::, SUMARY
1 H--..| NAVSUP 1114 STOCX RECORD CAROS FOR
FACILITY/GROUPai57ERoi ::. \- :| FAC/GRP, fillH, S^WARY
9i=-46S01 .-.. ! - 1 8 IN ID GLW LA8ELS (NON-KITS) ASSY, NUN, SUMMARY
8^0*01 1 I-' -







MATERIAL TAKE-OFF (MTO) ,V2 PROJECT
B-1S32R01 E „ .- ALPHA1
COToowj.wi.c.ii L<tt2S5 RErcROICE81532S02






t /:;::i f-- 1 NAVSUP 1275 INVENTORY RECCR0 FOR







1 i v- J 1
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!\. LUj Kt^UlrtfctltNIi 3T iCUllU.4
[
BTjolROl | KIT INVENTORY LIST FOR MANUAL INVENTORY KIT NO, SEC HO, ALP"*
SW2C01 •v-v "?.";•". '.-"I 1 SPECIAL 1109 CARDS FOR FAC/GRP FAC/GRP,- NIIS, SUGARY
83593001 SSSSK&iSwl SPECIAL 1109 CAHOS KITS HiC3 SEH KIT NO, SEQ NO, ALPHA
8359*001 . X&-U SPECIAL 1109 CAROS ASSY NON-KITS ASSY, NIIS, SEQ NO.
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e. ASSEMBLIES/EQUIPMENT COST CODES (ECCs)
(1
)
An ASSEMBLY is one or more stock numbered line items assembled
to support a specific task or function and identified by a five digit numeric
code, i.e. Individual Infantry Equipment for one man is identified as ASSEMBLY
02000. Kit, Plumbers for four men is ASSEMBLY 80001.
(2) Equipment Cost Code (ECO Civil Engineer Support Equipment
(CESE), consisting of Automotive, Construction, Weight and Material Handling
Equioment (MHE), and CamD Suoport Equipment are identified with a six digit
numeric -EquiDment Cost Code (ECO as defined in Management of Transportable
Equioment (NAVFAC P-300), i.e. the ECC for a QUARTER'TGN UTILITY TRUCK 'JEEP"
is 030/31.
(3) CESE Collateral Equipment, which enhances or extends the
equipment's capability, may be identified by the CESE's ECC with an alpha
suffix, i.e. the Deep Water Fording Kit for a Jeep is identified as 030731 A.
f. STOCK NUMBERS. To register as a valid requirement in the ABFC/TOA
system, a line item must be cataloged with either a National Stock Number
(NSN), recognizaDle DoD wide, or a Navy Item Control Number (NICN), which
could be a form, a publication, or a locally catatoged item. NSN/NICNs are 13
digits, of which the first six have meaning (Federal Supply, Group & Class and
Country Code), and the last seven are sequentially assigned serial numbers.
Information regarding non-stock numoered material may be found in heaoer or
note data within ASSEMBLIES.
(1) Stock Number Associated Data. Data within a stock number,, and
associated with it in the NCF T0A system, provides additional information as
follows':
(a) Group and Class. The first four digits of a valid stock
number indicate the Group and Class of material, as defined in Federal Supply
Classification (FSC) publications, i.e. Within Group 51 - "Hand Tools", there
are a number of Classes of Hand Tools, such as:
5110 Hand Tools, Edged, Non-powered (chisels, saws, etc.)
5120 Hand Tools, Non-edged, Non-powered (hammers,
pliers, screwdrivers, etc)
5130 Hand Tools, Power driven (power saws, drills, etc.)
(b) National Item Identification Number (NUN). The NUN
consists of the the last nine digits of the NSN/NICN, that is, Country Code
and sequentially assigned seven digit serial number. Stock record cards for
storeroom material are normally maintained in NUN sequence.
1. Country Codes. The two digits in the 5th and 6th
positions of the stock number indicate either the country cataloging the item,
i.e. "00" indicates material cataloged by agencies of the U.S Government prior
to the conversion in 1975 from Federal Stock Numbers (FSNs) to NSNs; "01"
indicates material cataloged by the U.S. agencies since conversions to NSNs;
"LF" for forms and "LP" for publications managed by Navy Publications and
Forms Center (NPFC), Philadelphia; "LL indicates material with limited DoD
interest and cataloged locally.
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NOTE: FACILITIES - always start with a numeric other than "0". (Example 134 45 E.
)
Since FACILITIES are numbered differently than GROUPS, "ALPHA" Codes
cannot be utilized to designate which echelon a particular FACILITY is in. In this
situation, Sections 15 through 17 are utilized to differentiate FACILITIES within
ECHELONS.
(2) FACILITIES are pre-engineered, functional designs of construction
related material and equipment in support of Components and TOAs. They are coded
with a Category Code/Nomenclature (CCN) code, required by DoO INST 4165.3 to identify,
classify and quantify all military real property facilities owned or controlled by
DoO and assigned to the Department of the Navy. The CNNs, which are indicative of
the use made of the facility, have been developed on the structured base of the three
digit DoO specified Facility Classes, Category Groups and 3asic Categories. Within
the Navy, two additional digits and one or two alpha coaes have been added to provide
more definitive and effective categorization of the Navy's facility assets.
Department of the Navy Facility Category Codes (NAVFAC P-72) refers.
ILLUSTRATION II FACILITIES CATEGORY CODE/NOMENCLATURE NUMBERING SYSTEM
N N N M N A A
FIRST digit is always a numeric other than "0" which_
indicates one or tne nine broad DoO Facility Classes"
1 Operational & Training Facilities
2 = Maintenance & Production
3 = Research, Development & Testing
4 = Supply Support
5 = Hospital /Medical
6 = Administrative Support
7 = Housing 4 Community Support
8 = Utilities & Ground Support
9 Real Estate (Class I Property)
SECOND digit identifies the DoO Category Group_
within the Facility Class
THIRD digit identifies the DoO Basic Category
FOURTH & FIFTH digits identify specific Navy Facilities
within the DoO Basic Categories
ALPHA suffix codes are used to distinguish between
individual designs within the ABFC System
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2. The last seven digits uniquely identify each stock
number item. For Navy Item Control Numbers (NICN) cataloged by CESO, the
first three of these seven digits may be assigned LCI, LC2, and LC3
indicate locally assigned temporary stock numbers, while LCA, LCB, and LCC
indicate locally assigned permanent stock numbers.
(c) Cognizance (COG) Symbols. COG symbols are assigned
within the Navy Supply System only, to identify the inventory manager and
whether the item is managed as a Navy Stock Account (NSA) or an Appropriate
Purchase Account (APA) item, i.e. 9g = Navy Stocks of Defense General
Material, 2B = Material Handling.
(d) Acquisition Advice Code (AAC). An AAC is a single
alphabetic character wnich indicates now (as distinquished from where), and
under what restrictions, and item is acquired, i.e. ACC "0" indicates DoD
managed and stocked material; "G" indicates GSA managed and stocked material;
"I" indicates material to be purchased locally, etc.
(e) Weight (WT) , Cube (CU), and Unit of Issue (UI) and Price.
Weight and cube data in tne ABFC /TOA data Dase are estimated for eacn item's
unit of issue. Actual weight and cube will vary, depending on methods of over-
packing for storage and shipment. Unit of issue and price information, while
current at time of printing the NCF/TOA, should be validated in the most
current Management List-Navy (ML-N) or Management List Consolidated (ML-C)
prior to requisitioning requirements.
(f) Shelf-Life Codes. Shelf-Life Codes are a one digit alpha
or numeric, devoting the she! f-1 ife span of material from date of
manufacture. For NCF TOAs, shelf life codes are listed in the Consolidated
Cross Reference/MTO documents, and defined in Afloat Supply Procedures (NAVSUP
P-485) Appendix 9.
(g) Hazardous Codes. Identify material that requires special
storage facilities and handling precautions. The Consolidated Hazardous Items
List (CHIL), (NAVSUP P-4500) outlines the requirements for stowage of
dangerous and semi-safe materials.
6. NCF TOA SYSTEM DOCUMENTS/REPORTS/MANAGEMENT AIDS. Numerous documents/
reports/management aids are avail aDie rrom tne ABFC/TOA program. Listed below
are ones applicable to units managing or concerned with NCF TOAs.
a. GROUP/FACILITY CROSS REFERENCE TO TA-SECTIQN (GRP/FAC X REF). This
report is a listing of groups and facilities in numerical sequence witn
descriptions (titles)' and quantities, cross-referenced to the TA and Section,
and serves as a Table of Contents.
b. ASSEMBLY/ECC CROSS-REFERENCE TO GROUP/FACILITY (ASSY/ECC X REF).
This report is a listng of assemolies and ECCs in numerical sequence with
descriptions (titles) and quantities, cross-referenced to each applicable
group or facility.
c. ABRIDGED TOA. The ABRIDGED TOA is an abbreviated form of the
"master" UNABRIDGED allowance format. The difference between the two is that
individual stock numbers are not shown in the ABRIDGED format. It is a good
document for weight, cube, cost and quantity data summarized at the ASSY/ECC,
GRP/FAC, Section, Echelon and total TOA.
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d. UNABRIDGED TOA. The Unabridged contains the required quantities of
Group/Facility "A" in the allowance, and shows the required quantity for one
(1) Assembly "B." The Assembly lists the National Stock Number (NSN)
quantities contained on one (1) Assembly. A total is given for the weight,
cube and cost of one (1) Assembly, and there the quantity is extended to total
quantity required, i.e. number of Group/Facility "A" times number of
Assemblies "B".
e. CONSOLIDATED CROSS-REFERENCE/MTO (CONS XREF/MTO). The CONS
XREF/MTO provides a complete overview of each line item in the TOA. It is
available in both ALPHA sequence and NUN sequence of stock numbers. The
ALPHA SEQ CONS XREF/MTO is the document most used by personnel in the field to
identify "requirements to stock number, and should be available in the major
supply support centers (CSR, CTR, etc.) and staff/company offices or shops.
In addition to the basic stock number data (COG, AAC, NSN/NICN, TITLE, U/I,
SHELF-LIFE CODE, WT, CU, COST), it consolidates and summarizes data by: the
number of times a particular stock number is used in an ASSEMBLY/ECC, number
of times that ASSY/ECC is used in a GROUP or FACILITY, number of times that
GRP/FAC is used in an ECHELON, and then totals the data for the entire TOA.
f. RECORD OF CHANGES (ROC). The Record of Changes is a comparison
between the current edition of the TOA and the previous edition. The intent
is to notify the user of the changes, i.e. total quantity change, unit of
issue change, COG symbol change, FSC change, and transfers.
(1) Items listed in one edition but not in the other will be
annotated as "NOT IN THE OLD ALLOWANCE" or "NOT IN THE CURRENT ALLOWANCE."
Such items may be true additions or deletions to the TOA or GROUP, but in most
cases they indicate stock number changes of the same or subs titu table
material. The ROC is in alpha sequence, so that in most cases, like items
will be listed together and stock number changes will be easy to distinguish.
However, personnel updating TOAs should be alert to the following exceptions:
(a) When the nomenclature on the new stock number is
different from that on the old stock number, the items may be listed some
distance from one another in the ROC.
(b) When a set, kit, or outfit is no longer procureable under
one stock number, the old stock number may be replaced with numerous new stock
numbers, without changing actual assets to the TOA.
g. STOCK RECORD CARDS (NAVSUP Forms 1114). Stock record cards are
provided for Material Management Codes "2" for CTR, "7" for CSR and "6" for
the various storerooms in the unit's allowance. NAVSUP Form 1114 cards cannot
be provided for 30000-80999 series kits; however, they are available for all
storeroom items in the TOA. After the initial outfitting of a unit or camp
with complete stock records, subsequent updates will entail stock record cards
for only those stock numbers not listed in the previous TOA storeroom groups.
h. STOCK LOCATOR CARDS (NAVSUP Forms 1075). Stock locator cards are
provided for the CSR Material Management Code "/" and CTR Material Management
Code "2". They are not provided for other storerooms within a unit's
allowance, but can be ordered separately from the Civil Engineer Support
Office (CESO 1571) if a specific need arises. As with the NAVSUP Forms 1114
above, after initial outfitting, subsequent updates will include only those
stock numbers not in the previous CSR/CTR allowance.
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i". BIN ID GUM LABELS are available, upon request, for marking
individual line item locations within storerooms and operating spaces.
j. KIT INVENTORY LIST. These lists are provided for Material
Management Code "1" CTR Controlled Kits for manual inventory, and have columns
to handle seven inventories. Line items are listed in alpha sequence, with
space provided for quantity and dollar value of shortages, departmental serial
number of the MAVSUP Form 1250 documenting the shortage, and the signature of
the person having custody of the kit.
1. ASSEMBLY CONTROL LIST FOR OTHER THAN KITS are provided for
Operating Space I "ems (OSI) for Material Management Code "4" that are normally
signed over to personnel on a semipermanent basis. (Administrative, General
Services and Special Staff operating space items, i.e. Chaplains Kit,
Photographer's equipment and supplies, Medical /Dental materials, etc.;
however, these listings are available for all assemolies other than
80000-30999 series assemblies)
m. MATERIAL TAKE-OFF (MTO) REPORT #1 is a line item NUN summary of
material whicn may be run at tne Project, TOA or GROUP level. When run at the
GROUP level, it provides Stock Number Sequence List (SNSL) for the various
storerooms and operating spaces.
(1) For Material Management Code "2" CTR Tools and Tools Support
and "7" Central Storeroom (CSR) combined group MTOs are provided.
(2) For Material Management Codes "5" Operating Space Items and "5"
Storeroom other than CSR, separate Group MTOs are provided.
(3) MTO reports are available upon request for all groups in NSN,
NUN or Cog/NSN sequence.
n. NSN BREAKDOWN OF SETS, KITS AND OUTFITS (SKO)
,
commonly known as
the "SKO", provides a lis: and description or items contained within a stock
number
. This product aids in the inventory process and procurement of replace-
ment components and selected tool repair parts. The "SKO" is distributed to
NCF units separately from their TOA Update package.
o. SUBSTITUTE ITEM LIST is a cross-reference between stock numbers in
NCF TOAs whicn nawe oeen superceded by new "prime" numbers, assuming that the
superceded material will be "utilized until exhausted". This list is issued
in "PRIME-TO-SUB" and "SUB-TO-PRIME" format.
7. NCF PACKUP /MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS. While ASSEMBLIES are the basic building
blocks of NCF TOAs, the material within an assembly is packed and managed one
of two ways, as either:
a. INDIVIDUAL ASSEMBLIES. Tradesman Kits (80000-80999 series
assemblies) and certain operating space items are packed and managed at the
individual assembly level. Kit Inventory Lists and Assembly Content Lists for
Other Than Kits are the primary management aids provided for these assemolies.
b. GROUPS OF ASSEMBLIES. For storeroom material and certain operating
space items, assemolies are grouped and line items are summarized for
management purposes. For example, the same sling is used for both M16A1
rifles (ASSY 02052) and for M-370 shotguns (ASSY 02060). By grouping these
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